

JPRS 74444

24 October 1979

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2036



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74444	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2036			5. Report Date 24 October 1979	
7. Author(s)			6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
15. Supplementary Notes			14.	
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/> Libya	<input type="checkbox"/> Sultanate of Oman	
Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/> North African Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/> Syria	
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/> Morocco	<input type="checkbox"/> Tunisia	
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria	<input type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates	
Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf Area	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Western Sahara	
Geography	<input type="checkbox"/> Egypt	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Qatar	<input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic	
Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia		
Military Sciences	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North Africa		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jordan			
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kuwait			
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lebanon			
b. Identifiers/Open Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 103
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price

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NEW EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN KIDNAPING OF IMAM CITED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 14 Sep 79 p 17

/Article: "New Information on the Kidnaping Operation in Libya: Khalifah Hanish, an In-law of al-Qadhdhafi's, Was the One Who Abducted Imam Musa al Sadr to Sabha"/

/Text/ Why did the three Lebanese youths (Khidr and Haydar Jamal-al-Din and Sami Muhammad Jabaq) of the Brigades of al-Sadr Organization choose an Italian, and not a Libyan, Lebanese or Iranian, airplane to hijack since all the latter countries have some relation to the vanished imam, Musa al-Sadr?

People who were on the Alitalia airplane when it was hijacked registered a number of observations:

1. The fundamental objective of the airplane hijacking was to proclaim the Brigades of al-Sadr Organization's secession from the Amal Organization command. In the communique which Radio Tehran broadcast, the hijackers accused the Amal command, which the absent imam had established with his blood, sweat and vigilance, of neglecting and exploiting the absence of the imam in order to create a leadership position for itself which it could exploit and through which it could remain all-powerful.
2. The choice fell on the Alitalia plane as a result of the announcement of the Italian public prosecutor's official report--a report which was handed to the al-Sadr family's lawyer in Paris. It has been bruited about by sources close to the al-Sadr family that the imam did not leave Libya and that Libyan intelligence tried to cover that up by sending two agents on two seats reserved in the imam's name on the airplane which left Tripoli for Rome on 31 August 1978.
3. Information received by Libyan sources exposed to al-Qadhdhafi's regime furnishes the entire story of the imam's disappearance, along with the names of the officers who carried out the operation. The seriousness of this information is that it emanated from inside the Libyan regime.

What does the new information say?

On 25 August 1978, Imam Musa al-Sadr reached Tripoli West Airport in the company of Shaykh Muhammad Shahhadah Ya'qub and the Lebanese correspondent 'Abbas Badr-al-Din, owner of the Lebanon News Agency. They stayed as guests in the second floor of the Shore Hotel!

The visit took place with the aim of participating in the celebrations of 1 September; thus the imam's insistence on traveling from Tripoli on 31 August, that is, on the eve of the revolutionary celebrations which he had come to participate in, is indication that something had happened which angered the imam.

Previously it was said that the imam had had an appointment with Col al-Qadhdhafi, then that he was informed a short time before the appointment that the appointment had been cancelled or postponed (it makes no difference), prompting the imam to leave without attending the revolution ceremonies he had come to participate in.

The new information indicates that the imam met 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud before the appointment which had been made with Col al-Qadhdhafi and that an unfriendly argument occurred between the imam and Jallud over the Green Book. The imam objected to statements in al-Qadhdhaffi's book which were prejudicial to the Islamic religion and the traditions of the prophet and the meeting ended after the two men had exchanged personal accusations. Maj 'Abd al-Salam Jallud accused the imam of being against the Palestinian revolution while the imam accused the Libyan authorities of trying to crush religious figures for no known reason.

Was the cancellation of the appointment between the imam and Col al-Qadhdhafi the result of the tempestuous meeting between the imam and Jallud?

What is certain is that the decision to leave is still fraught with secrets. There is no explanation for the fact that Nazzar Farahat, the charge d'affaires of the Lebanese embassy in the Libyan capital, did not attend the imam's farewell /ceremonies/ at the airport, especially since Nazzar Farahat knew that the imam was leaving and a personal friendship existed between him and the imam beyond considerations of protocol which required that he be present at the airport to bid him farewell. Why did he not attend?

The most frequently-repeated story among those who took charge of investigating the obscure circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the imam and his two companions is that the seats on the plane going to Rome were actually reserved and that the procedures for departure, and baggage, visa and ticket registration, had been completed, while the imam and his two companions were waiting in the room set aside for important visitors at Tripoli airport. When the departure time approached, an official car came and took the imam and his two companions from the important visitors' room

to the location of the airplane. However, instead of going to the departing airplane the car headed to where a C 13 /0/-class military troop transport airplane was waiting. The imam and his two companions were forced to board the plane, which took them to the town of Sabha. Accompanying them on the journey were the officer Sa'ud 'Abd-al-Hafiz and Khalifah Hanish, an in-law and right hand man of Col al-Qadhdhafi's. The commander of the military base at Sabha met the airplane and its passengers and detained them there. As the imam and his two companions were being transported to Sabha in the military airplane, police officer Muhammad al-Ruhaybi went to the airplane leaving for Rome, in the imam's clothes, after he had been made up in order to underplay the difference in appearance between him and the imam.

The new information which has emanated from within the ruling agencies in Libya has it that "The officer Muhammad al-Ruhaybi is the one who used the ticket which was in the imam's name and his passport; he is the one who stayed in his name at the Holiday Inn in Rome. In the hotel room, al-Ruhaybi changed into Libyan clothes from the imam's clothes, left the hotel and returned to Tripoli, on a Libyan passport after leaving Imam al-Sadr's suitcases in the room reserved in the Holiday Inn hotel, along with everything which could establish that he and his two companions had reached the Roman capital!

Dr Husni Kan'an, an aide of Imam al-Sadr's and director of the Political Bureau of the Amal Organization, has been quoted as saying that much evidence has been collected by the organization and the imam's family to confirm that Libyan intelligence made an unsuccessful attempt at deception and that the official report by the Italian public prosecutor who had been assigned to investigate the circumstances of the imam's disappearance soon disclosed it.

The question now is, what happened to the imam?

Here there are two accounts, one maintaining that he is still in the Fezzan Desert (Sabha is the capital of the Fezzan) and the other that he was eliminated at the military base and that an attempt was made to get rid of his body by taking it to Italy but when it failed he was buried in the sands of the Fezzan Desert!

Proponents of the latter account, who are also people who know Libyan intelligence agency secrets, cite as evidence the accounts made by Maj 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud when he visited Tehran and mentioned the words "the death of the imam" and "his elimination" more than 10 times, accusing the Savak Agency of the crime and stressing that the elimination occurred after he reached the Italian capital.

If, however, it is true that the elimination occurred in Italy, where are the corpses of the imam and his two companions?

Information on the reasons which prompted the three youths belonging to al Qadr's Brigades to hijack the Alitalia airplane adds that an attempt was made to force the hijacked plane to head for the nonaligned conference in Havana, the capital of Cuba, but the pilot of the airplane (Aldo Otorati by name) managed to persuade the three youths that going to Havana was fraught with danger because hurricanes in the Caribbean would endanger the passengers' lives, at which point the operation would change from a means for stirring up sympathy for the imam and indignation against the Libyan regime into a human catastrophe threatening the lives of the hostages, the airplane passengers, who were innocent and had no relationship with the Libyan regime.

The hijackers were won over by the pilot's statement and surrendered their arms before the plane landed in Tehran, demanding nothing more of the Iranian authorities than that they broadcast a statement on the reasons why they hijacked the airplane.

In presenting the hijackers' statement, Tehran Radio described them as Shiite revolutionaries.

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CSO: 4802

INTERVIEW WITH RAMALLAH MAYOR KARIM KHALAF

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 1-7 Oct 79 pp 18-24

[Interview with Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah, by Micheline Hazon, date and place not given]

[Text]

The mayor of the Israeli-occupied West Bank town of Ramallah told *Monday Morning* last week that West Bank mayors were not prepared to join the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian "self-rule" or meet with any American official.

Mayor Karim Khalaf was talking to this magazine in a long-distance conversation from Washington, which he was visiting at the invitation of the U.S. Palestinian community and the Palestine Human Rights Committee.

"During our stay, we were asked to meet with American officials," he reported. "We said no...If the American officials want to speak with the Palestinians, they can go to the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and speak with Abu Ammar (PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat) and his colleagues... Only the PLO can speak for our people... We have one leadership, and that leadership is the PLO... We, the mayors, have total confidence in the PLO. We are at its disposal, prepared to do anything it asks us to do."

All the American officials who visit the West Bank and seek meetings with Palestinian mayors "come to sell the autonomy project and peddle the Camp David agreements," he said, declaring that he had full confidence that the people in the occupied territories would be able to "foil the self-rule conspiracy."

Asked whether the West Bankers favored the recent PLO-Jordanian rapprochement, Khalaf lapsed into generalities, stating that the people in the occupied territories would back any Arab country which supported the Palestinians' right to

independent statehood and oppose any Arab country which stood between the Palestinians and that goal.

He said the unified Arab position against the Camp David agreements which emerged from last year's Baghdad summit was a good one, but he added: "We must be wary of future conspiracies. Once bitten, as they say, twice shy."

The recently enacted Israeli law which allows Israelis to buy land in the occupied territories poses no threat to privately owned land in the West Bank and Gaza, Khalaf said. "They can take a million decisions, but my people... will never sell one meter, one centimeter to the Jews."

He added, however, that there were public lands controlled by the occupation authorities, and "the fear is that the occupation forces will sell these lands to the Jews."

Khalaf said the black community of the United States had "stirred" American public opinion, which was now beginning to understand the Palestinian cause.

From what he saw in the United States, he said, he was optimistic about the attitude of the American people, but not about the policy of the American government, which "will remain against our cause and the aspirations of the Arab peoples."

He added: "I am now speaking to you from Washington, the capital and source of conspiracies against the wills of the peoples of the world — Washington, which has tortured the Palestinian people and is seeking to liquidate them and their cause."

The full interview:

What is the purpose of your current visit to the United States?

I came to the United States in response to an invitation from the Palestinian National Congress, which was held on August 17. I came to meet with my brother Palestinians and talk with them about the formation of the Palestinian Congress in the United States. I also came in response to an invitation from the Palestine Human Rights Committee, which also held a conference.

At the Congress, which was a success, I spoke about the practices of the occupation forces in Palestine. I spoke about the people in prison, about the torture. I spoke about the people who have been driven out of their land. I spoke about the

inadequate health services and the sub-standard health conditions that we have as a result. I talked about the bad economic situation.

I also said that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the only legal representative of our Palestinian Arab people, and that there is not and there will never be an alternative to the PLO, but that we shall continue to work with the PLO until victory is achieved.

During our stay, we were asked to meet with American officials. We said no, we will not meet with any American official, because I, as a mayor, do not represent the Palestinian people. I am an ordinary citizen. If the American officials want to speak with the Palestinians, they

can go to the PLO and speak with Abu Ammar and his colleagues.

The fact is that both conferences were successful — the conference of the Palestinian Congress and the conference of the Palestine Human Rights Committee. There were around 10,000 people at the Committee's conference — all Americans. I was really pleased to hear the speeches of (civil rights leader) the Rev. Jesse Jackson, (Southern Christian Leadership Conference President) Joseph Lowery, Congressman Paul Findley and (former Attorney General) Ramsey Clark — all of whom are supporters of our cause and our rights.

When Jesse Jackson told me he intended to visit the occupied territories, I told him, in the name of my colleagues the mayors, "*Ahlan wa sahlan* in occupied Palestine. I have one thing to ask of you: that you meet with the mayors of the occupied territories so that they can give you a clear picture of what is happening under the occupation forces."

Both conferences were really marvelous, and now I am about to return to my homeland and my people, to continue with them the struggle to foil the autonomy conspiracy.

I repeat: I shall not meet with any American official, because only the PLO can speak for our people. If the Carter Administration wants to talk about the Palestinian cause, it must address itself to the PLO.

After the Young affair and the visit of the U.S. black leaders to Beirut, and in the light of what you have seen during your stay in the U.S., do you feel that the American people are beginning to take a more favorable view of the Palestinian cause in general and the PLO in particular?

I feel that our brothers and friends, the

black community of America, are standing by us — especially after what happened to Andrew Young. Over here, the blacks are speaking out daily, declaring that the PLO has the right to exist, that it is the representative of the Palestinian people, and that the Palestinian people must have the right to self-determination.

The stirring of American public opinion was started by the black community and by some good whites who are working for our cause.

I am optimistic, but my optimism relates only to the people of America. As for the American government, I believe that it will not change its policy, that it will remain against our cause and the aspirations of the Arab peoples — and you, my dear sister, know this very well.

We came here to let the American people know that we are not terrorists. We came to tell them that we have been driven out of our homes and dispersed, and that half our people are living in camps, waiting for the day when they can return to their land.

We said to the American people: "Is the terrorist the man who demands his rights, his homeland, or is he the man who attacks the homeland of other people and disperses them? (Israeli Premier Menahem) Begin, who came from Poland in 1943, formed the Zionist Irgun gang and was the perpetrator of the Deir Yassin massacre, among others — is he to be known now as a man of peace? And are Arafat and his brothers, who are struggling for the liberation of Palestine, the terrorists?"

The American people have begun to understand our cause a little. I am very pleased to hear the American information media speak about the Palestinian cause and Palestinian rights daily. I was glad to hear our brothers the American blacks say that the American people were not aware

where their tax money was going; they did not know it was being turned into tanks, planes and artillery with which to kill innocent women and children in occupied Palestine and South Lebanon. These are things which our brothers in America are not accustomed to hearing, but now they are hearing and speaking about them daily. This is a great gain for our cause as Palestinians and Arabs — for the Palestinian national movement, the Palestinian Revolution, the Lebanese national movement and the entire Arab nation.

On his last visit to the area, U.S. Presidential envoy Robert Strauss met with Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij. Do you think he will be meeting with other West Bank or Gaza mayors, and would you yourself be willing to meet him?

As I told you, we, the national movement in the occupied territories, are against any meeting with U.S. officials. When (U.S. special envoy Alfred) Atherton came, and when (Assistant Secretary of State Harold) Saunders, (U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus) Vance and Strauss came, we were asked to meet them, but we refused. Freij agreed, but that was his own initiative and he did not present the views of the national movement in that meeting. The national movement, including myself, is against any meeting with American officials.

I am now speaking to you from Washington, the capital and source of conspiracies against the wills of the peoples of the world — Washington, which has tortured the Palestinian people and is seeking to liquidate them and their cause.

Why does Washington want to speak to Freij, or (Gaza Mayor Rashad) Shawwa, or (Nablus Mayor) Bassam Shakaa, or Karim Khalaf? Why? We are not representatives of the Palestinian people. We

are ordinary Palestinians, and we have a leadership. If Carter or Strauss or any other American official wishes to speak to the Palestinians, he must speak to the PLO, not to us.

I can assure you that Strauss, along with Begin and (Egyptian President Anwar) Sadat, is working to implement the self-rule plan. But believe me, our people in the interior will foil all the conspiracies that have been woven against our cause, including the self-rule conspiracy. Our position on this autonomy plan and American policy in general is well known. The American officials who come to the occupied territories come to sell the autonomy project and peddle the Camp David agreements. But I have full confidence in the strong will of our people in the interior. They will foil the conspiracy.

At any rate, we will never meet with any American official, and I repeat: we have one leadership, and that leadership is the PLO.

Is there any chance of other Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza joining the autonomy talks?

No, I don't think so. It's out of the question. If I do have any fears in that direction, they are minor fears relating to the Gaza Strip. These fears spring from the fact that Egyptian administration is now back to el-Arish, and as you know, Gaza was under Egyptian military rule before 1967. My fears on this score, however, are dwindling, because the will of our people in Gaza is strong, and they will never allow any person to impose the autonomy plan.

You can be certain that we will continue our struggle to foil the autonomy plot.

Do the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza view the PLO-Jordanian

rapprochement as a positive development?

The unified position adopted at the Baghdad summit against Sadat and the autonomy plan had a significant effect, of course, but the major factor (in the opposition to the autonomy talks) was our people in the occupied territories, who were the first to stand against the autonomy conspiracy and the first to block it. Even those in the West Bank and Gaza who initially favored self-rule are now standing with the national movement in the occupied territories against that proposal, although they are not members of the movement, of course.

So you consider Palestinian-Jordanian rapprochement a positive development?

Jordan's position against self-rule helped, naturally, where our pro-Jordanian brothers were concerned. It was a good position, and it helped a great deal.

Is this rapprochement felt in the occupied territories? Do you feel it has had a positive effect there?

Well, of course, we are in favor of any Arab country which supports our rights and stands by us in our struggle. It all depends on the position of the Arab countries, any Arab country. We would welcome the support of all Arab countries which stand by us and struggle with us toward the achievement of our legitimate rights. By the same token, of course, we will stand against any Arab country which opposes our cause.

The Baghdad summit unified the Arab position against Sadat and his regime, and that was a great gain for us. But we must be wary of future conspiracies. Once bitten, as they say, twice shy.

After the Israeli government's decision to allow its citizens to buy land in the occupied territories, is there

any danger that West Bank and Gaza citizens will sell land to Israelis?

Never. You can set your mind at ease on that point. They can take a million decisions, but my people, our masses in the occupied territories, will never sell one meter, one centimeter to the Jews. Let them enact a million laws; if selling is not made compulsory, we will never sell our land to the Jews. You can be sure of that.

So what threat does the new law pose?

There are no threats where privately owned land is concerned. But there are public lands, and these are under the control of the occupation forces. The fear is that the occupation forces will sell these lands to the Jews.

Over one third of the total area of the occupied territory has been expropriated by the military authorities. But no matter how much of our land is expropriated, and no matter how many settlements are established, our morale will remain high, and we will with the same determination continue our struggle to liberate our country.

Is there any chance that any West Bank or Gaza mayor will attend the U.N. General Assembly as part of the PLO delegation?

I don't believe so. We are saying that the PLO is our legitimate representative, so naturally, it is the PLO that is entitled to represent us at the U.N. We, the mayors, have total confidence in the PLO. We are at its disposal, prepared to do anything it asks us to do. I had a visit to New York set for October 4, but I have

and the establishment of our independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO.

On behalf of my colleagues the mayors, our students, our people who are suffering every second of every minute of every hour, I say to our Palestinian brothers in the diaspora, to our Arab brothers and the peoples of the world who are supporting our struggle for our just rights: You can be certain that we are steadfast and shall continue our struggle until we have our rights and our independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO.

CSO: 4820

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

JOINT CHEMICAL INDUSTRY--Bahrain and Kuwait last week announced that they had set up a joint company whose first project would be to build ammonia and methane industries. The general manager of the Bahrain National Oil Company, Hassan Fakhro, said feasibility studies would soon be submitted to the two governments for approval. The two plants would be built in Bahrain at an estimated cost of \$300 million, he said, adding that he hoped they would be operational by 1982. The products will be exported, he said. The joint company, known as Bahrain-Kuwait Petrochemical Industries, is the first industrial joint venture between the two Gulf states. Its capital, 140 million Bahrain Dinars (\$369 million), will be jointly shared by Bahrain National Oil Co and Kuwait Petrochemical Industries Co. [Text]
[Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 1 Oct 79 p 12]

CSO: 4820

REMEDIAL MEASURES FOR SOCIAL, OTHER PROBLEMS DESCRIBED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 7 Oct 79 p 12

[Article by Mustafa Zawi: "Report from Algeria: Operation Punch: Is It Dust in People's Eyes or It It People's Heads Rolling? Lack of Security Has Exceeded the Imagination; Counteraction Has Amounted to Abuse of Power; The Cleanup Operation in Algeria, Which Is Known Inside the Country as Operation 'Punch': How Is It Taking Place, and How Far Has the Opposition To It Gone"]

[Text] Under the blue sky of the airport of the Algerian capital--the Dar El-Beida Airport--a tourist arriving in Algeria is overcome by the impression that a sudden fever has befallen the people. What is the truth about the matter? Is it a case of chaos, or is it one of construction activity? During this period which is characterized by heavy traffic because of the fact that there is a large number of emigres on vacation, security forces are finding it difficult to control the pressure of the throngs of travelers who became alarmed over the fact that several air flights were unexpectedly cancelled. Can this place be the place for launching the campaign which the Algerian authorities began on 4 September to improve conditions? Is this the place that was turned into an encampment?

Among the unavoidable signs of this campaign is the extraordinary prevalence of policemen with their military uniforms in the streets of the capital. [They may be seen] in pairs who form what looks like "a sanitary ring." The sidewalks that used to overflow with garbage appear clean, and the overcrowdedness that obstructed traffic on the principal roads has diminished. The waiting lines in front of the bus stops have become less chaotic, and the small displays of goods, which were responsible for the prosperity of the black market, have miraculously disappeared. The facades and the balconies of buildings have become cleaner.

The Reasons for Discontent

In spite of the obvious results of operation "Punch," the people of Algeria appear downcast. The feeling is prevalent among them that they are in the position of those who have been released [from imprisonment] but are under

observation. The truth is that the discontent is not without cause. Several cases of unjust treatment have been noted ever since the first days [of the cleanup campaign]. Policemen have committed acts of violence against civilian victims. Several excuses such as "obeying orders," "not heeding the law," and "attacking policemen" were made for such incidents. [This incident] happened in front of me on the Didouche Mourad Street which leads to the al-Kulliyat Tunnel. Two policemen stopped a student whose conduct was irreproachable for questioning. No sooner did "the transgressor" express his objection to this, than he was struck with a cane. Soon it was the turn of his companion who had crossed the street to intervene between the two parties. This incident occurred in front of pedestrians who were fearful and resentful and who did not dare to interfere. Not even those men who serve in positions in the existing regime, such as academics and state prosecution officials have escaped from these blunders.

Goals and Justifications

The organized pursuit of the unemployed here brings to mind sad memories about the surprise campaigns that were carried out by the security forces during the Algerian War. Young men disappeared from view in order to escape "the labor camps" that had been prepared in complete secrecy for this purpose.

The corrective campaign, as it was presented by Mr Saliah Yahiaoui the principal party official, is officially and equally seeking to provide hygienic conditions in the country, to combat crime and negligence in official departments and [to fight] the tendency for absenteeism from work on projects. Malik, who is one of the activists of the National Liberation Front, says in a decisive tone, "The citizen must be reeducated. Social ills have reached a point that warns of danger. We believe that the opportunity to oppose the matter still exists." The fact is that the lack of security is almost universal. Attacks on women and attacks on pedestrians who do not even try to defend themselves are innumerable. Thieves do not hesitate to resort to the use of traditional weapons. On a bus going to Martyrs' Square, two young men approached a 45-year old man; they calmly searched his pockets while no one interfered out of fear that they may be subject to revenge.

Physicians' "Malady"

The Algerian press relates these incidents in detail. But the phenomenon that would have been unimaginable in the days of Boumediene is the fact that the press is no longer timid about making harsh critical comments against "some senior officials" who are aggravating wastefulness and favoritism "at the nation's expense." According to Malik, "the gangrene" has spread to all sectors of activity, and complaints [are now heard] in every home.

One of the subjects that are foremost on people's minds is that of health. The results of free medicine, for example, were disastrous, and this is confirmed by the practicing physicians themselves. The political decision that Boumediene made, which was not preceded by any specific preparation, resulted in attracting a large crowd of spurious patients to the hospitals. Hospital sections were becoming overcrowded every day with scores of those patients. This was at the expense of preventive medicine. "We are spending the best time we have in treating patients who are not sick. Meanwhile there are thousands of children who have not been immunized." Dr 'Abduh, who is doing his internship at the Mustafa Hospital in the capital, is quoted as acknowledging the existence of epidemics in the city of Algiers. And how not? Inadequate health conditions, water that is distributed in limited quantities, a rapid increase in the population and shabby housing conditions have contributed to a large degree to helping the return of diseases whose eradication had been presumed.

Frustrated in their resolve, practicing physicians are not satisfied to offer deficient medical service. Most of them behave like civil servants. They follow the example of administrators, and they work half the time. Work begins in the emergency section at noon. Only a few senior physicians, who received their training in the United States, remain unable to change and to go along with "the new hours."

Those who avoid service complete the work day in national corporations which employ them to carry out medical examinations to counter previous ones. These counter examinations amount to 60 per day. They are carried out on patients who had been advised by the same physicians in the morning at the hospital to stay away from work.

Other physicians go to their offices or look after their businesses. "Everyone today is a business man." This statement was made by Dr Kamal, a dermatologist who is torn between his professional conscience and his desire to go along with others. "As a matter of principle, combining jobs is forbidden. But there is no control over this. It is sufficient for one to have someone backing him in the Ministry of Health so he can have all the positions [he wants] at the same time." In some offices the number of physicians who take turns among themselves to work sometimes amounts to three.

In view of this prevailing chaos, nurses play the role of physicians and go so far as to prescribe treatment. "The incidents are innumerable," and the stories that are being told in the capital and in academia are shocking. There are surgeons who smoke in operating rooms, and there are others who refuse to perform surgery for feeble excuses. In addition, there are stories about errors in diagnosis. The variety of these stories is such that there is one to please every taste. Kamal sighs and says, "Many people die at the Mustafa Hospital. And when two medical professors meet, what do they talk about? They talk about tomatoes and potatoes just like all the people do."

Two Incidents and a Standard

It is said that al-Sayyid al-'Amiri, the health official responded to questions raised by medical students who criticized supervisory inadequacies by saying, "You have to manage your own affairs 1,000 percent."

There are two incidents which explain the decline in the standard of medicine in Algeria. The SONATRACH Corporation for Oil, which has influence in Algeria, hired about 46 foreign specialists. It pays each one of them a monthly salary of 2,600 U.S. dollars. This is three times the salary of an Algerian physician. At the same time there are young, unemployed physicians who refuse to accept positions in poor areas in South Algeria.

On the other hand more Algerian families are trying through bribes to obtain social security coverage to meet the [financial] burdens of sending their patients abroad, and especially to France. Algeria pays the costs of this medical care in dollars. This burdens the social security budget since foreign holdings coming into the country from the transfer of funds by migrant workers has been diminishing continuously for 4 years. The immigrants prefer to double their holdings or to triple them by not following the official means (post offices and banks) in sending their checks. They prefer to go to Agencies that conduct their business activity in semi-secrecy. This is the black market, and no one is ignorant of this. It is controlled by senior politicians and military men who are making a fortune for themselves in Europe by investing their funds in real estate, in restaurants and in hotels. The names of these figures themselves are no longer a secret.

The Effect of the Strike

At the same time the social climate has deteriorated grievously. Workers no longer hesitate about contemplating arbitrary strikes, thereby overruling the instructions of officials in their trade union, which is the Algerian General Labor Federation [UGTA].

Last March the port of Algiers was paralyzed as a result of the fact that dock workers had gone on strike for almost a week. In June the workers of the industrial complex of the National Steel Company refused to work. They were asking that their demands on wages be approved. The strike spread quickly to all the units, and general management had to yield.

The word, strike, itself was outlawed during the days of Boumediene. It has gone a long way to becoming widespread like gunpowder. Every time workers did get what they want, the authorities had yielded to avoid exacerbating the mischief.

It is in the context of these circumstances of social tension which are exacerbated by the disappearance of goods from the market and by price increases--the evil of this situation becomes widespread usually during

the month of Ramadan—that the fact-finding campaign is taking place. No one doubts that this campaign was determined at the highest levels of the party machinery.

After 6 months of actually exercising power, the government of Mr Abdelghani is giving the impression that it is only handling the affairs of a nation. The morning of Cheadli Bendjedid's election as president it seemed that the introduction of a larger measure of liberation from the government's regime was desirable, or rather inevitable. Early indications of this were noticed in the release of political prisoners and especially in the abolishment of "exit visas from the national region." This was one of the administrative inconveniences which travelers were subjected to. In general, the Algerians' hopes were disappointed.

Did the government want to deal a major blow [to the people] by assuming anew the reins of power in the country?

It is no longer a secret at party offices that heads will roll. This includes the heads of some members of the Political Bureau. (This is the bureau that replaced the Revolutionary Council.) The campaign to improve conditions may be the only emerging part of a floating iceberg.

Is the matter then a process of throwing dust in people's eyes, or is it a moral revolution?

The Algerians who have experienced many purges are still in doubt, and who can blame them for their doubt?

8592

CSO: 4402

OFFSHORE BANKS POST NEW HIGH IN ASSETS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Oct 79 pp 9-10

[Text]

Bahrain's 51 offshore banks had combined assets of \$24.5 billion at the end of July, with a steadily increasing share of their business now being conducted in Gulf currencies, the French-language Beirut weekly *Le Commerce du Levant* reported last week. The banks had reached a plateau of about \$23.2 billion last autumn, falling back to \$22.2 billion in April of this year; the inflow resumed in May, however, and the Bahrain Monetary Agency said there had been a spectacular rise in dollar transactions conducted by the banks in July.

Bahrain's success in attracting offshore banks can best be judged by recalling that the country's first two Offshore Banking Units (OBUs) founded by Citibank and the Algemene Bank had assets of only \$1.7 billion when they opened their doors in December 1975. Since then, Bahrain's OBUs have had to cope with a number of problems, notably a persistent shortage of local currencies due in large part to the unwillingness of central bankers in the Gulf to allow their currencies to play a significant role in international money markets.

Le Commerce du Levant said the shortage of Gulf currencies was a constant cause for concern among Bahraini OBUs. Public sector spending, which is one of the principal ways in which money reaches the economies of Gulf states, has fallen below the private sector's demand for cash to meet import bills. The result, according to one Bahraini banker, was that "the market for regional currencies is lacking in depth."

President Carter's moves last November to defend the dollar, coupled with the rapid deterioration of the situation in Iran, presented the OBUs with serious problems. These were enhanced by new regulations by

the Central Bank of Kuwait apparently intended to slow down a flood of Kuwaiti capital into Bahrain and the confusion which reigned for a brief period in Saudi Arabia when the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) moved its headquarters from Jeddah to Riyadh.

The strengthening of the dollar at the end of last year meant that Gulf states were more willing to hold dollar-denominated assets, leading to a decline in the amount of local currencies on offer and high interest rates in Bahrain for deposits in these currencies. In order to stem the flow of Kuwaiti funds attracted by these rates, the Kuwaiti authorities ordered commercial banks there to treat all deposits for terms of one month as tight deposits which must be retained in the country.

Le Commerce du Levant cited fluctuations in interest rates for the dollar as well as the shock waves throughout the Gulf following the revolution in Iran as reasons for the slowdown in offshore banking in Bahrain earlier this year. The pickup in May was due to expectations that interest rates for dollars would rise and also to the opening of an OBU in Bahrain by the Saudi National Commercial Bank, which eased the shortage of Saudi Riials there.

The Bahrain Monetary Agency reported there had been a steep rise in deposits for one month in July but that the biggest increase had been in three-month time deposits. Bahrain's OBUs carried out transactions totalling \$4.6 billion during the month, a new record, with 33 per cent of the deals in local currencies. Large buying orders for sterling were recorded although sterling does not normally occupy a large place in Bahrain's money market.

Looking forward, *Le Commerce du Levant* noted that about 20 per cent of the assets of Bahrain's OBUs were denominated in Saudi Riials and that any change of policy by SAMA could therefore have a severe adverse effect on these banks. The presence in Bahrain of two Saudi OBUs – the Saudi National Commercial Bank and the Gulf Riyadh Bank – was seen, however, as an indication that the Saudi authorities looked with favour on the development of offshore banking in Bahrain as a valuable addition to the region's financial services.

Assets of Bahrain's offshore banks
(In \$ millions)

	Commitments			Assets		
	1978	1977	1976	1978	1977	1976
Banking sector	17,947	11,770	5,536	16,405	11,478	4,426
Non-banking sector	4,786	3,513	598	6,166	3,705	1,734
Other accounts	708	418	80	870	518	54
Arab states	11,666	8,254	2,578	11,688	7,065	2,487
Western Europe	7,018	4,995	2,277	5,301	3,903	1,129
Offshore centres	1,850	1,538	923	2,971	1,888	1,241
Other accounts	1,016	493	222	3,204	2,376	1,344
North America	1,891	419	214	277	468	13
Dollars	15,459	11,268	4,471	16,031	11,594	4,387
Regional currencies	6,720	3,567	1,169	6,065	3,241	1,196
Other currencies	1,262	866	574	1,335	866	631
Up to 7 days	5,078	3,344	1,714	2,793	2,259	1,059
8 days to 1 month	7,420	6,224	2,131	5,846	4,180	909
1 month to 3 months	6,101	3,506	1,487	6,598	3,538	1,517
3 months to 6 months	3,590	1,973	681	4,230	2,850	1,164
6 months to 12 months	881	504	149	1,152	826	445
12 months to 36 months	174	53	43	1,112	811	662
More than 3 years	197	97	9	1,710	1,237	458
Aggregate totals	23,441	15,701	6,214	23,441	15,701	6,214

Source: *Le Commerce du Levant*

CSO: 4820

KHOMAYNI'S LEADERSHIP SUPPORTED BY WORKERS' CONFEDERATION OF IRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Sep 79 p 12

[Text] Resolution of the first congress of the organizing council of the Labor Confederation of Iran.

The workers participating in the first congress of the organizing council of the Labor Confederation of Iran published their positions and demands in a resolution at the end of the congress:

Support for the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni; demand for the suppression of foreign, traitorous elements and imperialists and reactionary plots and anti-revolutionary elements; official recognition of the organizing council of the workers' confederation; safeguarding of the freedom of workers' political union activities without any kind of required restriction; participation of the real representatives of the workers in the codification of labor law; complete purging of the directorship of factories from agents dependent on imperialism and reaction and anti-revolutionism; unconditional nationalization of industries, banks, and insurance companies dependent on imperialism; cutting off the hands of capitalists who are thieves; providing equal pay for equal work to male and female workers; granting and assuring of forty hours work per week and granting equal vacation for all workers, whether laborer or employer; control of prices and the cutting off of hands on account of the intention to raise the price of workers' purchases; energetic attention to the situation of disability insurance and the health and housing of the workers of Iran; prevention of the unregulated firing of workers and the securing of work for unemployed workers; and the fixing of a wage scale on the basis of the minimum wage approved by the Ministry of Labor.

In the same declaration the creation of a special power is considered a factor negating freedom in the workplace, and the workers must demand the immediate cancellation of the decision for the creation of this power.

In paragraph fifteen of the declaration occurs the following: We representatives present at the congress of the organizing council of the Workers'

Confederation of Iran, with regard to the lack of the most rudimentary welfare measures in the areas of retirement and insurance and health and housing of workers, brick kilns and the onerous, medieval manual labor of these brothers in return for trifling pay, emphatically demand that the provisional government of the revolution take immediate measures to remove the above hardships and institute a wage scale based on the minimum wage approved by the Ministry of Labor.

9524

CSO: 4906

BANI SADR CRITICIZES THEOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 23 Sep 79 pp 7, 8

[Text] While Iman Khomeini and his religious aides emphasise on the importance of Velayat Faqih (theocratic leadership) to the development of the country claiming that there would be no dictatorship under such an Islamic government, some members of the assembly of experts, including Aboul Hassan Bani-Sadr, member of the revolutionary council and top Islamic economic theorian have [as printed] criticised Velayat Faqih claiming that it would be almost impossible to have such government in the world today.

Azzatollah Sahabi, member of the Assembly of Experts said in one of his televised speeches in a south Tehran park that such a government simply was not possible anywhere in the world today and that even during the early days of Islam it was not very successful. Sahabi added that such a government will no doubt lead to a very strong Islamic dictatorship. Sahabi also criticised the Assembly of Experts adding that the members were supposed to be discussing the draft of the constitution already printed in the papers and not to write an Islamic constitution anew. He then said that Ayatollah Taleghani was never the head of the Revolutionary Council and that he had not even participated at the council for the past six months.

CSO: 4920

IRAN SEEN GROPING FROM DESPOTISM TO CONFUSION

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 31 Aug 79 pp 4, 5

[Article: "Islam, Revolution, Eurocentrism"]

[Text] Innovative at its inception because of the originality of the Shiite leadership, some aspects of its struggle, the heterogeneity of the forces that took to the field, etc., the Iranian "revolution" is on its way to becoming paradigmatic--negatively so, of course--if its final aftermaths are to be those that have been discernible during the recent weeks. Not, of course, in the sense that Alberoni who, wearing now the garb of the nouveau philosopher, writes in this regard (CORRIERE DELLA SERA 25 August) that "all collective movements contain the matrix of despotism" and that democracy, therefore, is a "delicacy" reserved for a few refined palates: which is a well-mannered way of closing the door to an understanding of the emancipation, and hence the democratization, of the huge masses of humanity that has taken place in the last few decades. After all, it was indeed its collective character--the collective character of a long and bitter struggle which, lacking that character, could hardly have enjoyed the sympathies of the vast military and police forces at the tyrannical disposal of the shah--that originally gave to the Iranian movement its connotation of "revolution."

But could and can the casting out of the tyrant, the broad sweep of the popular movement that forced him out, the international repercussions and effects of the 11 February uprising, far-reaching as they were, altogether define a revolution (without enclosing the term in quotes)? Notwithstanding the deep-rootedness of the rebellion that occurred, I would be inclined to use more discretion in this regard. Not out of regard for a classic model of revolution in--to use a term now in vogue--the "terzinternazionalista"* sense. On the contrary. In seeking to understand from within and yet as

[*Translator's note: Italian expression coined from elements of "terzo mondo" [third world] and "internazionalismo" [internationalism] to convey the concept of a "third-worldish notion of internationalism."

a layman the Iranian succession of events and, I repeat, its novelty--independently of the identity of its leadership (in this case a religious movement that acted as the agglutinant in a widely variegated political and social array)--it has been extremely helpful and important to be able to free one's self from all traces of Eurocentrism and from the classic mold of the literature on revolutionary processes. Among other things, the haughtiness of the European and indigenous presses--in considering Islam as an inferior, uncouth, and primitive religion: and this continues even today, almost to the point of being unable to counterpose of Khomeyni's doctrines such names, works and thought, ranging from those of Mohammed Abduh to Taha Husain, from Ali Shar'iaty to Allal Al Fassy, as cannot be omitted from any modern cultural baggage--was such as to cause at that time a legitimate vexation and, in turn, a forcing of judgements as to the real internal force relationships within the antimonarchic array and within the Shiite movement itself.

This is why we must not review and evaluate, from the standpoint of the novelty inherent in revolutionary processes and from that of the actualization of certain crucial problems in a revolution, the course presently being imposed on Iran by the Khomeynist movement (the outcome of which, however, is by no means yet certain).

I am not surprised, for example, that its integralist and despotic tendency (the dissolving of the political parties, the muzzling of the press, etc.) was catalyzed by the issue of nationalities (primarily that of the Kurds, but also those of the Hezarehs, the Baluchis and others). Here, an important shift has taken place. One of the issues in the struggle against the shah was that of the re-attainment of a national identity, which had been suffocated by Americanization (not only as an "external" way of life but also as an economic structure with a "consumeristic" base), and thinly veneered with a nonexistent historical recall to the Persia of Cyrus the Great. This quest for a national identity led to the Iranian-Muslim-Shiite concept (an ancient ecumenical concept of the caliphates), which set aside the specific problems of the nationalities, of the other religious faiths, and of the other ethnic groups that were not secondary in the makeup of the Iranian nation and certainly not strangers to the struggle against the tyranny of the Pahlavis. This problem of the ethnic, religious and other differences was in itself already acute. But it was exacerbated by a heavy-handedly centralized and authoritarian state structure. However, this state structural model--which was already in existence before the tyranny of the shahs, father and son, who maximized its repressive functions--was not made an issue by the Khomeynists. The now famous "Khomeyni committees" do not in this sense represent a new democratic power counterposed to the old. The committee-government duality is not really a duality of powers, partly because the government actually has no powers whatever. It is Khomeyni who commands together with his still anonymous Revolutionary Council. Lastly, and precisely in the conflict with the Kurds, the committees and the army (finding via this road a return to a central role?) worked shoulder to shoulder in the repressive action in the name of the Iranian state.

And when, as is happening, the nationalities issue (and not itself alone) is mixed with a laceration of the social body and with huge economic imbalances, everything becomes more complicated. What emerges is a complex equation involving the national identity issue, the nationalities issue, and the social issue which is after all the central issue of a liberation and of an independence. And this brings us to another crucial point in the Iranian question and, more generally, in the problems of a revolution.

The impressive thing about the struggle against the shah was the broad scale of social forces that took part in it. The fact is that the old regime had built up an economy based entirely on foreign revenues (oil), on the depredation of its national resources, on islands of "primitive productionism" (I use here an Iranian expression), etc. It is well known that because of its dependence characteristics the latter type of industrialization had not only aggravated all the imbalances (especially between the city and rural areas) but had also not even produced a wider distribution of the wealth: It was inflation, wastefulness, and rampant parasiticism that brought down the shah, with virtually the totality of the social classes in rebellion against him. These are known facts. But it is also well known that the economy was nevertheless to some extent a growing one (neocolonialism, especially in countries that are rich in energy resources, is not necessarily a stagnation but rather an interlacement between development and underdevelopment), was giving rise to new social and productive forces, and had, in sum--and though in a distorted and ultimately disastrous manner--set in motion new economic and social dynamics. Iran had therefore become a country characterized by a complex social structure, with social classes and strata pitted against each other, at least where their material interests were concerned. Islam's interclass precepts tend generally to obscure this fact, and we now know how precarious was the "Islamic socialism." But what is most striking in Iran is the total absence of any socioeconomic plan whatever (let alone the emergence on the scene of any new social class); in other words, the absence of any "government of development" through substantive reforms designed to guarantee it by freeing it of its dependency chains.

It goes without saying, to recall the words of a great scholar of the Arab world, that "the Muslim world is unique but not an exception," and just as there is no Catholic or Buddhist economy, neither is there any "Muslim economy." Not only are sacred writings imprecise in economic matters but, even if they were precise, how would one go about finding "prescriptions" in them for governing and revolutionizing the development-underdevelopment interlacement inherited from the shah? It is not by mere chance that the Iranian economic crisis is becoming more acute, that the country has for months now been living off of its "foreign income" from the proceeds of oil, that its productive apparatus is decaying, and that a semipermanent form of "aid" for millions of Iranians has been established. The consequence has been a narrowing of Khomeyni's base of popular consensus (it seems, for instance, that the Bazaar, one of the vanguards in the struggle against the shah, no longer supports the Ayatollah), which means a contraction and

reduction of the array that guaranteed Khomeyni his victory. And the more serious consequence is that as structural and superstructural stresses and conflicts have set in (probably reaching beyond the lay or clerical spheres) the response has been placing constraints on democracy, with the abolition of political parties and of other means of mediation through political power. In summary, everything is following a consistent trend.

And this brings us to one last--at least for the time being--crucial point. In Iran, religion has been deeply involved in the political reawakening, and Islam has until very recently been the rallying banner symbolizing an individual and collective identity that unified hundreds of thousands, millions of men, women and youngsters. In other words, Khomeyni, regardless of the opinions held of him by his fellow countrymen, has also been the symbol of a cultural restoration (of its history, its civilization, its pride, etc.) from a "domination" by another culture. These are the facts exactly as they have taken place, and certain rough spots, certain simplifications, while they may appear shocking, should not be surprising: One of the normal channels of the anticolonial struggle is provided by the quest for an uninterrupted historical and cultural continuum, and hence a moment of antithesis and contraposition to any form of alien cultural domination is in many ways an unavoidable crossing. But this having been said, a revolution must face the problem that arises immediately in regard to the interaction among national specifics, indigenous cultural peculiarities, and contemporariness and modernism. It is possible and often necessary to resist a "modernization" that involves deculturation and national alienation phenomena; but the new ideas that are part of the heritage of all humanity can certainly not be resisted without repression; nor can one revert to archaism in defense of national traditions--not only in matters of dress but above all as regards social relationships. The problem is at the same time simple and complex. This is true for the capitalist West, which can no longer think of itself as the center of the world, which must come to an understanding of other and diverse cultures, and which can no longer make of its "industrialized civilization" its sole value judgement parameter. But it is also true for the other cultures, for those which only yesterday were peripheral, relegated to marginality, denigrated, and which today are co-makers of history, which--to use the words of a great Arab intellectual--must "advance in step with our times," meeting the challenge of its problems. The rich dialectics between diverse cultures and histories cannot, at a time when the world is taking on polycentric connotations, be, under any circumstances, unidirectional. There is more need today than ever for those dialectics as a new highway for world civilization. And it is through revolutions and movements of emancipation and liberation that this must be brought about: by us all, from the European working classes to the forces of liberation of what has been until now the third world. Otherwise we shall fall into retrogression, and others will be the forces that take to the battlefield--under the banner of a restoration.

9399

CSO: 4404

PANIRANIST PARTY LEADER'S OPEN LETTER TO BAZARGAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 12 Sep 79 p 12

[Text] Letter of Mohsen Pezeshkpur to the prime minister.

Mohsen Pezeshkpur, leader of the Paniranist Party, has written an open and anguished letter to Engineer Mahdi Bazargan, the prime minister, and has asked: What has happened that the sons of one great nation have taken aim at each other's breast?

Pezeshkpur wrote in part of his letter:

Honorable Mr. Engineer Bazargan, where should my afflicted compatriot, experienced in suffering, carry this anguish; with whom can he express it in speech? And how can you and I and every other Iranian who lives in this interval of time and must, for the future age and human society, be planning this nation's great mission reply that in any case now, for days and weeks and months past, the scene of encounters of the sons of Iran with one another has been occurring in the plains, the mountains, and the country districts of the "Land of Iran"?

But is it not so, that after enduring prolonged years of tyranny, violence, and oppression, millions of sons of the great nation of Iran, from the courageous Kurds to the fighting Baluch, from the sons of Abu Moslem Khorasani to the brave Azeri men and fighting women, participated altogether in the movement of a lofty, glorious, and blessed revolution?

What happened to those harmonious and rousing songs of the revolution which swept up our country from end to end? What happened that we should now witness such painful events in Kordestan, this purest and most loyal hearth among the divisions of the great nation of Iran--in the territory of men and women whose highest aspiration in life is love of Iran and the culture of Iran?

Pezeshkpur concludes his detailed and lengthy letter, after analysis, examination, and investigation of recent events, with these sentences: Speaking as one Iranian, I think that, with so many centuries elapsed of the history of the name "Iran," love for Iran can be the resolver of the problems and misunderstandings of every group of the sons of the nation of Iran.

IRAN

ARMY CONGRATULATED BY BAZARGAN ON ITS TRIUMPHANT ENTRY INTO MAHABAD

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Sep 79 p 12

[Text] The prime minister's congratulations to the army.

Engineer Mahdi Bazargan, the prime minister, addressed his congratulations to the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a letter which he sent to his excellency General Mohammad Hoseyn Shaker, head of the joint chiefs of the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for the victorious arrival of expeditionary units of the 64th (Orumiyeh) Division into the city of Mahabad, which took place on the 12th day of the current month Shahrivar [3 Sep 79] without loss to the national forces, and he thanked the army personnel.

In part of the prime minister's letter to the head of the joint chiefs of the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran comes the following:

The leadership of the revolution and the government expect that the purging of these areas from the mercenary, traitorous anti-revolutionaries and the establishment of security and prosperity for the Kurdish brothers and sisters will achieve success as swiftly and as well as possible with the help of God and with the efforts of the armed forces and the police and the army of the revolution.

They convey the government's praise to its coworkers and to all participants in these undertakings from commander to soldier, including the air and airborne forces who have maintained effective loyalty and support.

For the blessed martyred ones I beseech from God boundless mercy, forgiveness, and compassion, and I send fatherly condolence to the bereaved families.

9524

CSO: 4906

COUNTERREVOLUTION MUST BE RECOGNIZED IN ALL ITS GUISES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Aug 79 p 3

/Article: "The Combatants of the Islamic Revolution: The Counterrevolution Must Be Recognized in All Its Guises"/

/Text/ The Organization of Combatants of the Islamic Revolution has published a statement on the occasion of the advent of the Eyd-e Fetr /end-of-Ramazan holiday/. Through a brief analysis of the two Eyd-e Fetrs--those of this year and last--a few points were made to the Iranian people in this statement. In one part of this statement it was declared:

"Once again we have passed the changing nights of Qadr, and the determining and creative month of Ramazan, and a great day lies before us. Truly this holy month is for the second time teaching us its fruitful and compassionate role in a practical sense. It was last year that during this month, with the message of the emam, the doors of the mosques opened themselves to the tumultuous waves of the people and the exploding cries of "God is great" burst forth from every direction from the resilient, kind domes of the mosques, setting forth through the alleys of the city like a crashing flood.

"Eyd-e Fetr was the beginning of a new phenomenon in the revolutionary history of the world, a phenomenon in whose analysis all sociologists have fallen short."

In another section of the statement it was declared:

"Here we have spent the first Ramazan after the revolution in the shelter of the absolute leadership of the Emam, and once again our nights of Qadr have brought down a rain of mercy which this time nurtures the region and the Islamic world and holds it in its grasp. By the grace of God we hope that the valuable message we witnessed in the period between the occurrences of this blessed month on this land will come into being throughout the Islamic countries in opposition to the great setan of Zionism this year and that next year our holiday in commemoration of God will be more glorious, more victorious and more joyous."

In another part of this statement, reference is made to the philosophy behind festivals; it is pointed out that festivals are basically of two kinds, traditional and religious. Festivals related to religion always contain greater social significance, and sometimes greater moral force, but, until the Islamic revolution of Iran, because of the evil scheme being carried out by the imperialists through the brigant Reza Khan and his son, the value and the existential philosophy behind these festivals were absent, and nationalism and reaction--especially that of the royal kind which was amenable to the regime--took the place of religion and rebellion against the forces of evil."

At the conclusion of this statement, it was said that "In view of present conditions in Iran and the brutal attacks against the revolution, and the miraculous revolutionary leadership of Emam Khomeyni, we mention a few points to the dear revolutionary people of Iran: Let this holiday be just like that of last year, the decisive beginning of the Islamic revolution and its brilliant future victories.

"1. The guise of the force of counterrevolution has been recognized not only in Kordestan but everywhere else as well; in the words of the emam, let them be dealt with 'in a revolutionary fashion' so that this entire bloody soil may be cleansed. Otherwise we will no doubt always be confronting their masters' scheme somewhere.

"2. Persons and groups which are opposed to the Islamic revolution and the emam's platform must be purged, arrested and punished.

"3. The military solution is merely an obligatory reaction to counter-revolutionary schemes which have prevented fundamental revolutionary economic and cultural reforms; notwithstanding that, we are aware that basic, fundamental measures must come about in order to eliminate the deficiencies and inadequacies of the free Kurdish, Baluch, Arab and Torkoman Moslem peoples.

"4. One must vigilantly ensure that all the emam's demands and commands to the government, the army and other organs be observed in full, because it is only through the careful implementation of the orders of the leader of the Islamic revolution that we will be victorious and that our revolution will attain its lofty and temporal goals, with God's help.

"/signed/ Combatants of the Islamic Revolution, 22 August 1979."

11887

CSO: 4906

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE TO PRESENT SCRUTINIZED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Aug 79 p 6

/Article by Ali Faqih: "Which Is More Revolutionary--the Government or the Revolutionary Courts?"/

/Text/ In KEYHAN newspaper of 19 August, Mr Foruhar made the following statement on page 9, in connection with the most recent problems of the country: "I must state most sorrowfully that, as the Imam has proclaimed, the government is acting very weakly. Perhaps the reason for this weakness is the presence of elements of power outside the government, such as the Committees of the Revolution, the revolutionary tribunals and other entities which call themselves revolutionary but from which no activity has emerged except the obstruction of government activity."

Regarding this statement, the following points must be expressed:

A period of 6 months has passed in the life of the government of Eng Bazargan, the present prime minister of Iran, who came to power by decree of Imam Khomeyni. What has happened in this period, how the revolutionary government has acted, how it has faced the many problems of the underprivileged people in themselves constitute a separate story for which there is no room in this article. Rather, our basic thrust here concerns something else, not a discussion of the issue of what our people's expectations of the temporary government have been and how they have been evaluated but rather what our government's expectations of the people have been. Perhaps one should have been asked early in the game about the extent to which the government has succeeded in satisfying, or at least taking a step toward meeting, the basic demands and requests of the Moslem people, in other words, the extent to which the temporary government has succeeded in making itself conform to the tumultuous revolutionary movement of our people. Now, however, in the current conditions, the question must be asked the other way around.

The Vital Arteries of the Working Forces

One must ask to what extent the people of Iran have succeeded in conforming to the tortoiselike movements and reformist maneuvers of the government,

in particular those ministers who hold the pulse and vital arteries of the working forces of this society directly in their hands. Of course we will not be capable of answering this question unless we become well acquainted with and analyze the situation in the cabinet, or at least the situation concerning some ministers who trail claims as long as a sheep's intestines around behind themselves. Except for a few ministers, whose names we are all familiar with and who really have a brilliant combative past, the rest of Mr Bazargan's cabinet consists of bureaucrats who know nothing about revolution and revolutionary action, except for what they have perforce heard about, or professional politicians who are even, because of the narrow blind view of the world and the conservative policies which they exude, content with the Western kind of democracy and freedom. Let us go back to the statement by Mr Foruhar, with whose name we are all familiar; although Mr Daryush Faruhar was not known before the revolution, his face became familiar in the course of it. In his statement, he considered that the revolutionary organs and organizations, which also enjoy an executive status, are troublesome, and he accused them of being obstructive and disruptive of the government's activity, stating that they have thereby become obstacles to the implementation of the government's revolutionary decisions! In order to plumb more deeply into the meaning of his statement, and to differentiate truth from falsehood, it would be better if we quoted the rest of his statement. By way of example he mentioned that the revolutionary tribunals were among the nongovernmental organs which were placing obstructions in the way of the government's work. One must truly state that in the view of reformists revolutionary action is to be condemned, and it is here that our question acquires meaning--that is, when Mr Foruhar proceeds to criticise the work of the revolutionary tribunals, the revolutionary tribunals which are truly one of the rarest organs, perhaps the only organ, to act in a decisive revolutionary manner since the beginning of the revolutions, engaging in executing the devoted followers and hirelings of American imperialism--the revolutionary tribunals which attracted our discussion and the uproar of imperialist and Zionist circles--nonetheless no sign of hands trembling for the prosecution of justice appeared in those tribunals until Ayatollah Khomeini became the head of religious law and the government's control over the courts was removed. As the well-known saying has it, "If you want to see what your work is worth, see what your enemy has to say about it." It was clear what the reaction of American imperialism and the Zionists was to the execution of Hoveyda, Elqanian and so forth. Now one must ask Mr Foruhar: "What have the revolutionary tribunals done to deserve this kind of censure and reproach on your part? Shouldn't the execution of counterrevolutionaries cause the government to spread its wings for more basic measures? How can your discomfort and your wailing over the activity of the revolutionary tribunals be justified? What work and what obstacles worth mentioning have you yourself carried out so far concerning the activities of workers, in your capacity as minister of labor? Aren't you one of those who are still sitting behind the minister's desk, carrying out party politics and appointing a worker from your own party as your assistant? Aren't you the one who is banging on every door and wall to prevent the formation of councils and implementation

of the power of councils in the factories? Aren't you the one who wants to replace the council with syndicates which have been abolished by fighting Moslem workers? Aren't you the one who, instead of investigating the material conditions and welfare of workers, which is possible only with the support of their Islamic councils, is engaged in defending the employer and his representative in the factories? One must state that it is amazing that you are still in power and that you have come to possess the trappings of power." Many times we have witnessed our people's broad, unstinting backing for the revolutionary tribunals' decisive revolutionary measures, but we have never heard workers indicate that the Ministry of Labor is their protector and supporter. Rather, the workers' whole grievance is that the Ministry of Labor has put the same paper-shuffling and massive satanic administrative apparatus into operation once again and that not only has no legislation on the running of affairs appeared--the ministry is constantly obstructing workers' affairs by failing to approve the Islamic councils, which are their true representative and the true protector of the interests of the government and the people. (To show the veracity of these statements it is enough that Mr Foruhar lend an ear to the Worker's Program of the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran.) Once again one must ask, "Mr Foruhar, what is your answer? How do you justify your position on the revolutionary tribunals? Perhaps what you mean is that the revolutionary organs are obstructing your reformist activities, which is what the Moslem people of Iran and the revolutionary leader of the people, Imam Khomeyni, want." (At this point one must request the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran to rebroadcast the imam's latest statements so that Mr Foruhar can pay close attention to them.) Is Ayatollah Khosrowshahi obstructing the work of the minister of housing by striving to hand the apartments of parasitic capitalists over to the underprivileged, or is the minister of housing obstructing the work of the revolution by exclaiming to the heavens that we have no such provisions in law and vagrantly wandering after the law in order to steal away the coquettish hearts of the capitalists? Where is it written down and codified that conservatives and reformists can drag revolutionaries and radicals to court? Can you answer, Mr Foruhar? You must know that with the new chapter of the revolution which the revolutionary leader of the underprivileged, Imam Khomeyni, has opened by his latest orders, the time has come for these naive beliefs to end. I ask almighty God to inform you and your kind of people of this fact.

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CSO: 4906

PILOT CALLS FOR DELAYED DECISION ON F-14 AIRCRAFT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 79 p 10

/Article: "An Open Letter from a Pilot: Is the Sale of F-14 Aircraft in the Public Interest?"/

/Text/ A matter which no official, no expert, no responsible person or even any member of the Moslem nation of Iran must forget is the Imam's command concerning the need for a discussion of and confrontation with "the subject of power."

The Moslem people possess a power which caused the world to stand in amazement--a power which the great and priceless backing of the blood of hundreds of thousands of martyrs and millions of fists have consolidated. If anyone, God forbid, cannot or does not want to be aware of this amazing power, it is treason not only to the people but also to Islam, that he occupy any position or status.

The people of Iran rose up so that by overthrowing the self-indulgent regime, the satellite of imperialism, they could not only carry out their lofty objectives, which were the establishment of a government of divine justice and manifestation of the true face of Islam, but also gain sovereignty over their national resources and their destiny.

Although the previous regime, because of its nature, confronted international aggressors from a position of weakness and abandoned itself to imposed, enslaving agreements, it and its masters were thrown out some time ago and have left, to be consigned to the garbage dump of history.

Reliance on a Great Moral Force

It would not have been possible to escape from the clutches of such devils and to remove their grasp, their acts of extirmination and their repression had it not been for reliance on a great moral force--the ideological power of Islam.

It was this force which shook the world and, with the brilliant explosion it created in the world, caused a great change in order to move and benefit all the underprivileged persons of the world.

It is this truth which needs no special proof or evidence; the transitions in the current conditions of the world alone will show the great effects of the Iranian revolution.

The point of this introduction is that the era of weakness, submissiveness and accommodation has gone for good and that no place for imposed and one-sided agreements, sales or purchases remains. The imposed purchases of the past are no argument that we should also acquiesce in imposed sales.

Now that the technology and armaments with which devastating imperialism weighted our shoulders down at exorbitant cost, in order to preserve its own interests, have become lost, it itself has fallen prey to panic and is trying to remove them from our grasp. Otherwise, what reason is there for statements in the American senate to the effect that "our technology has come into danger in Iran?"

What does the nominee for the premiership of Canada's promise to buy F-14's from Iran if elected, mean?

What does the letter from the Zionist organizations of America to Carter concerning the repurchase of Iran's new weapons prove?

Once again, is there any room for argument that we need a strong, well-equipped army to preserve the security and agins of the revolution and the integrity of our strength?

To Implement National Soversignty

Is there any room for argument that military armaments and technology (apart from materials for which the price was excessive, or materials which were imposed) require an enormous sum from the budget, or that the high price of some goods is not proof that one can do without them? Is there any room for argument that we have spent large sums of money on training specialized F-14 staffs and pilots in recent years or that we need an advanced defensive system, especially a high-altitude defensive airplane, in order to impose national sovereignty, preserve air superiority and protect the country's borders and outlets? Finally, is there any room for argument that in selling the F-14 it will take at least 3 to 5 years' time and a new budget to replace such an airplane and train the technical and flying staff for it? In my opinion, there is not.

Rather, the argument ought to be over who should replace the defense system, how and at what price, in the event this sort of armament is sold.

The argument is over who will be harmed--the person making the recommendation or the person who shows, or pretends to show, a distaste for the purchase? The argument concerns the matter of strength and weakness.

The F-14 and the likes of it are now part of the treasury. They are an advanced technology which belongs to us and is at our disposal. It is up to us to keep it, sell it or replace it and enter into transactions with any country on any conditions we like. from a position of strength. The adoption of hasty decisions with respect to it or other new arms is neither proper nor wise. Why at least should we not replace it with the types of airplanes we have, whose maintenance requires no foreign experts?

Should this not be the case, it still seems better to me to assume that we use 50 percent of the airplanes than to give up 100 percent of them on easy terms without any guarantee that people will not immediately place them at the disposal of our direct or indirect enemies.

Secondly, any country which wants to acquire this many airplanes must now wait several years in time at least and pay a higher price as well.

In view of the above facts, would it not at least be better for us to put off a decision as to whether to keep them or sell them until after the elections, when it will be under the responsibility of the future stable Islamic republican government of the country?

Peace. /Signed/ A pilot, signature withheld.

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CSO: 4906

RIFT DEVELOPS IN IRANO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 16 Sep 79 pp 4, 5

[Text] After seven months since the victory of the Iranian Islamic revolution during which the Soviet Union had boldly supported the new regime, signs of slackness in the two countries' relations have already become evident. Months before the victory of the revolution, the Soviet officials praised the religious revolutionaries and condemned the Shah's regime. And, following the victory, the Soviet Union was quick to recognise the new Islamic regime in Iran and sent its ambassador to Qom to meet the Imam. Even the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party continued to support the new Islamic regime although it was expected that a communist party should have acted totally differently. Tudeh Party's support for the new Islamic regime was to such an extent that it lost a number of its supporters who were absorbed by other Marxist parties, including the Fedayeen Khalq. Tudeh Party's leader became the laughing stock of the people and called him Ayatollah Kianouri, as a sign that the party was not faithful to its own doctrine.

During the election for the members of the assembly of experts, even the prominent figures in the Tudeh Party who have great fame and reputation among the older Iranians, like Ehsan Tabari, did not receive much votes, compared with the younger and unknown members of other rival communist parties like the Fedayeen Khalq.

Last week, a top Soviet commentator on foreign affairs, Alexander Bovin said that the high hopes born of Iran's Islamic Revolution have collapsed into economic chaos and political and ethnic repression. Bovin, whose public comments are believed to reflect Kremlin thinking blamed the turmoil in Iran on the Islamic clergy and their attempt to impose a Muslim state. Exclusive sources believe that the Soviet leaders have already reached the conclusion that supporting the new Islamic regime in Iran will not alter the beliefs of religious leaders who would still attack communism and consider the communists as anti-religion elements.

According to the exclusive sources, religious leaders believe that with the power of Islam and people's deep affiliation for Islam, non-Muslim powers could be overcome and that there would be no such thing as super-power. In addition, the power of Islam, which managed to uproot some 2,500

years of monarchy in Iran and the legendary might of the Shah's army could also have favourable effect on the Soviet Muslims who are the actual neighbours of Iran and are willing to learn more about Islam and its wonders.

Observers believe that one other reason for the change of attitude adopted by the Soviet leaders is the fact that Iran has already decided not to construct the second pipeline which was to transport Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union, thus enabling them to export their own gas from the north fields to some European countries.

Exclusive sources believe that religious clergies close to the Imam have informed him that selling Iranian natural gas to the countries who do not believe in God would not be right according to Islam and that Iran's natural gas would always have customers and that all the cities and villages in Iran should first have free access to gas before Iran could consider to export it, particularly to the countries whose people have no religion at all.

CSO: 4906

LIST OF PERSONS WINNING DRAW TO GO TO MECCA PUBLISHED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Aug 79 p B-1

/Article: "The Names of 21,700 Pilgrims to the House of God from the Province of Tehran"/

/Text/ In the name of the almighty: God has made the Ka'ba the sanctuary as a support for the people: Declaration by the Organization of Religious Endowments:

The names of the 21,700 who have been chosen by lot to visit the house of God this year, out of the 44,562 people who volunteered to visit the house of God and registered in the 20 branches of the Bank Melli in Tehran during the stipulated 2-week period, are hereby listed, subdivided by each /bank/ branch. The persons selected are requested to pay attention to the following points:

1. The names of the persons selected have been announced in Bank Melli Iran registration area branches. Therefore applicants may learn of their selection by referring to the branch in which they registered their names, with the documentation of the receipt in their possession, and may note down the classification number of their registration area, in order to ascertain the address and location of the medical examination.
2. The classification numbers of applicants' wives immediately follow the husbands' classification numbers.
3. The persons selected must appear for an examination at the clinics assigned by the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation below this announcement, in the table listing the pilgrims' names and addresses and means for consultation, in the light of the capacity of each clinic with the original of their identity cards and two four by six photographs in their possession.
4. Examination of pilgrims will be conducted from the morning of Saturday 22 August to Monday 2 September, exclusive of Fridays, at the clinics which have been assigned.

5. Visitors will be given a medical examination by specialized physicians in each clinic; in the event their good health and physical fitness are established, they will be vaccinated against smallpox and el tor and the necessary certificate will be issued and provided them.

6. Following medical examinations and the issuance of cards or certificates of acceptance and health certificates, pilgrims must consult with the directors of the elected Religious Endowment Organization Group and register themselves. The names of the directors of the elected Religious Endowment Group and individual expenses for pilgrims will soon be announced, following approval by the Higher Pilgrimage Council.

Note: Applicants whose names are not included in the list of selected persons may exercise their right to priority for the coming year or, if they prefer, reclaim the deposit they have paid.

/Signed/ Religious Endowments Organization

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CSO: 4906

CRACKDOWN ON COMMUNISTS ANTICIPATED

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 16 Sep 79 pp 5, 6

[Text] Exclusive sources maintain that after the approval of the new Islamic constitution, the officials would stage a crackdown on all communists and communist parties as well as leftists in a bid to fully implement Islamic and Koranic laws.

Cracking down of the communists and leftists would begin with a broad anti-communist publicity campaign designed to inform the Muslims and other less educated citizens of the dangers of communism to Islam and humanity. Meanwhile, speculations have run high that prominent communist and leftist political figures will also be arrested in order to discourage supporters of these parties or leftist ideologies to continue supporting leftist doctrine and severe punishment would be imposed for the supporters of communism.

Exclusive sources believe that when the new all Islamic constitution has been approved and implemented, then those who do not believe in God would be considered as dangers to the society and their activities would be against God. Punishment for fighting with God or being an enemy of God is death and already a large number of former officials have been executed for being an enemy of God.

CSO: 4906

MASS EXODUS OF IRANIANS DEVELOPS

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 16 Sep 79 pp 2-7

[Text] Services

Airlines suffering from the irregularity of their services to and from Iran last winter, made gloomy forecasts about their prospects for the rest of 1979. The picture they drew did not become any brighter with the clamp down on travel in the early days of the Islamic republic. But soon, the authorities lifted the total ban, and opened a single gateway--Mehrabad airport.

The authorities have naturally tried to ensure that none of the men of the past regime still on the "wanted list" escapes from the country. Precautionary measures have been taken to ensure that. But following the conditional amnesty granted by Imam Khomeini, the "list" has grown shorter, enabling more and more Iranians to leave the country.

Many airlines had already cut down their flights per week. Soon there was a shortage of seats on out-going aircraft. IRAN AIR did increase its flights to Europe and the USA, but other airlines found it uneconomical. An Iranian traveller has to overcome a number of difficult hurdles these days before he can leave the country--for whatever reason.

Passports

Obtaining a passport by an Iranian citizen is a chore that can take anything upwards of two weeks. Many citizens find it inconvenient to go to the passport office which has been moved to near the Hilton Hotel. Once there, they must fill a form and present a number of documents such as a certified copy of their identity card; in the case of men, a certificate completion of national service or exemption from military service, and in the case of women a notarised written consent of their husbands or parent to leave the country. The applicant must pay a number of taxes (which in the past included a contribution towards prison welfare!) totalling around Rls. 6,000. Having obtained a passport, the applicant must pay Rls. 20,000 for an exit permit.

Unlike many countries, a passport cannot be obtained by mail and the applicant must present him/herself. On each subsequent departure, he normally needs individual exit permits and payment of Rls. 20,000. Furthermore, he must also present his passport to the airline carrying him at least five days in advance for security clearance.

The previous constitution had no provision recognising an Iranian citizen's right to travel abroad. A passport was given at the state's pleasure and withheld whenever deemed appropriate. Every passport carried a routine stamp making it invalid for emigration purposes. The security authorities looked down with displeasure on any Iranian visiting a country on the black list unless he had permission from Savak. Iranians who unwittingly visited a communist country such as China or even a Moslem country like Libya or Iraq, faced official displeasure on their return. To some extent this is still the case.

Students used to be given special passports which entailed surmounting their own hurdles like passing an English language test or obtaining approval from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

There were separate regulations for pilgrims going to Mecca or to holy shrines in Iraq. At present, a person intending to go to Mecca has to register his name through the local mosque. Every year, the government announces a quota. Since the number of applicants is invariably larger than the quota (this year for instance more than 100,000 Iranians registered) the authorities draw lots. The successful pilgrims then are given special passports good only for a visit to Saudi Arabia.

Travel Expenses

Under the previous regime, there were no restrictions on the amount of travellers' cheques or bank transfers in foreign currencies that an Iranian traveller could take with him. The rich usually took vast sums not only to spend on their bona fide needs but also to either invest in property or even to gamble away at the leading casinos of Europe and the United States.

Under the Islamic regime, tight controls have been introduced through the Central Bank for a number of reasons. The primary reason was to stop remnants of the corrupt officials of the previous regime from transferring their ill-gotten wealth. Another reason was to conserve foreign exchange for more useful purposes, especially as foreign reserves had been down due to interruptions in oil exports. Yet another reason is the basic attitude of the authorities towards foreign travel in view of the past experience when they thought Iranians fell under the influence of Western corruption and decadence.

As a result of all this, the sale of foreign exchange is now restricted to each traveller to US\$2,000 sold at the official rate of Rls. 70.6 per dollar, and a further US\$2,000 at the commercial rate of Rls. 79.0 per dollar.

When some applicants obtained such money and immediately sold it on the black currency market within Iran for as much as Rls. 110 per dollar, the authorities tightened the regulations to discourage such attempts. Now, the bank will issue foreign exchange only after seeing the prospective traveller's air ticket and will also demand a deposit of Rls. 30 per dollar refundable on the traveller's return to Iran. His return must be verified by his passport bearing immigration officer's exit and re-entry stamps.

At one stage, it was even rumoured that the banks would not refund the deposit unless the traveller had spent a minimum of three weeks abroad, but this was not officially confirmed.

Air Ticket

Since the only frontier now open is Mehrabad Airport, every traveller who intends to go abroad must obtain an air ticket even before he can purchase his traveller's cheques. For many, this is only the beginning of their troubles. As already noted, many airlines have reduced their flights compared to last year. This not only applies to Iran Air, but also to such major airlines as Pan Am and British Airways. To obtain a booking, many Iranians have had to wait for a whole month. It is not possible for many of them to go on the waiting list because of the requirement to submit their passports five days prior to the flight's departure.

Airlines have found it difficult to meet this increased demand economically. To do so, they must increase the number of their flights but under the present travel pattern, when most Iranians seem to be leaving the country and not returning, their flights to Iran would be uneconomical. Hence, airlines are not prepared to increase the number of their flights. Most of these airlines expected the pattern to gradually change. At the end of the summer, they said, most Iranians will begin to return home. This is yet to materialise.

In fact, the travelling pattern has remained quite unusual. Despite the approaching end of the summer, Iranians are still leaving in large numbers, although many of them are now believed to be students returning to their schools abroad. Most airlines are still fully booked up for weeks ahead.

Visas

Another major hurdle for the Iranian traveller is obtaining a visa. The most popular countries--the USA and UK--have faced a deluge of Iranians. The UK immigration authorities have taken a much tougher attitude and in effect appear to have repealed their "no visa" agreement with Iran. Every Iranian arriving at Heathrow has to satisfy highly cynical and notoriously unhelpful British immigration officers of their intentions to leave the U.K. and of having sufficient funds for their visit. To be on the safe side, many Iranians have been advised to go to the British Embassy and obtain a visa, though even that is no guarantee of entry.

Obtaining a U.S. visa is an more difficult, not because of the American attitude, but because of the sheer number of applicants. The U.S. authorities recently had to open a new consulate section to handle the larger numbers. Queues are normally formed days ahead and as many as ten thousand are known to have applied in a single day.

Discouraged by this tougher line, many Iranians have turned to other embassies. These range from Spain to New Zealand. But most embassies are reluctant to give visas unless they are certain of the bona fide intentions of the applicant. They are careful, especially about those whose application to enter a nearby country has been turned down. There have recently been press complaints about Germans refusing Iranians entry across the Austrian border.

A basic requirement by most consulates is proof of financial assets in the form of travellers cheques or foreign bank deposits as well as a return ticket. This makes obtaining an airline ticket all the most important since without it, an Iranian traveller can neither obtain travellers' cheques nor a visa. As each of these chores may take several days, and the passport must also be submitted five days in advance--and the Iranian exit visa is usually valid for only two weeks--one can appreciate the state of mental anguish of the average traveller.

The Traveller

Past statistics have shown that an average of 600,000 to 800,000 Iranians travel abroad each year, mostly to Western Europe, followed by the USA. The decline in travellers during the early months of this year has been more than made up by the exodus since last April. In the past, most Iranian travellers were tourists spending between two weeks and one month abroad, either as individuals or members of tour groups.

During the current year, apart from a sharp increase in the number of young persons and children going abroad for studies, there has also been a noticeable increase in the number of those who are leaving for permanent or semi-permanent residence abroad. These include capital owners, industrialists, businessmen and a large proportion of retired civil servants.

Having surmounted all the hurdles, arrival at the airport does not prepare them for the harrowing experience of queueing before the airline counter, the searches of their personal belongings and the checks, followed by hours of waiting to board a plane.

Many passengers having gone through a thorough search of the suitcases and joined the queue, find others jumping the queue and airlines overbooking passengers. They often are confronted with new regulations made up on the spur of the moment by the airlines, the airport authorities or other officials, all of which tend to add to the congestion and the confusion.

An example of these was a recent rule by Iran Air that passengers had to deliver their luggage 24 hours before their flight. Another example is the sudden announcement by the customs on restrictions on the export of any carpets as personal belongings of passengers. Since the airlines are tough on passengers carrying even a small rug into the cabin with them, this leaves the passenger with the difficult choice of placing the carpet in a suitcase and delivering it 24 hours earlier--not being sure of finding it when he reaches his destination.

Having passed the luggage search and found a seat on the plane, the Iranian passenger must go through immigration to collect his passport. Many a disappointed passenger has returned home on finding his passport misplaced or, worse, finding himself on the black list, forbidding him from leaving the country.

Despite all these problems, a large number of Iranians have managed to leave the country, and most of them seem to eventually end up in the USA. According to the U.S. authorities, most of the times of US courts dealing with immigration matters is taken up by Iranians. According to California authorities, the number of Iranians in Southern California alone has been estimated at around 100,000. There are now travel agencies, restaurants, hotels with Iranian names and even a kabab shop calling itself "Persian Hamburger". Oakland now boasts a chelo kabab shop.

There are two Persian language publications in California alone and recently even a radio station went on the air broadcasting in Persian.

The reason that so many Iranians go to the USA is its relatively easy immigration regulations and the relative ease with which an Iranian can obtain the coveted 'green card'. Apart from those who go for studies by the tens of thousands, an Iranian with a close relative who is a U.S. citizen; or a rich Iranian with some capital (minimum requirement for investment is believed to be \$40,000) usually has no trouble getting into the USA.

Many top Iranians from the previous regime, such as Jamshid Amouzegar, Houshang Ansary and Hassan Ali Mehran walked into highly paid jobs, with the World Bank or in the U.N. as they had been reserved for them. Lesser known Iranians such as wives of corrupt officials or senior officers of the Shah's regime have invested in real estate or other property. In fact, some well-known wives are now operating real estate agencies. Some former singers have joined local television channels. Others are providing guide and tour services for newly-arriving Iranians.

Many Americans are already complaining that the arrival of so many Iranians, all of whom seem to be rich, have pushed up real estate prices beyond reason, and are crowding schools. In a single summer language school of 472 students, 320 were Iranian.

European countries are too small and over-crowded to allow so many Iranians in. Britain is already suffering. Other EEC countries less frequented by Iranians such as Italy, have now unofficially adopted a tougher line. This has diverted future emigrants to other destinations either in Latin America or Australia and New Zealand.

PROFESSIONALS LEAVING THE COUNTRY IN LARGE NUMBERS

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 23 Sep 79 p 7

[Text] Central Bank officials have reported that some \$2 billion have been smuggled out of the country since the victory of the revolution. The money has been exported by the dealers in the black market at exorbitant rates, largely by the middle class Iranians who wanted to flee the country under various pressures.

Exclusive sources claim that professional groups like doctors, teachers and engineers have been the first to leave the country since they were not able to continue working in Iran, while other groups also have been selling all their properties fearing that their children may not be able to continue their studies in Iran.

Political observers claim that some middle class people, including religious minorities, believe that the present trend in the country and the rate of unemployment would inevitably lead the country towards communism and therefore, they are trying to leave the country before it is too late. A conservative estimate has put the number of immigrants since the revolution at over 60,000 families, who have mainly been professionals. On the other hand, a number of European and American countries have granted working permits to the professional Iranians in order to facilitate their residence in their own countries.

Reports from the Persian Gulf states also indicate that Iranian doctors, engineers and top level accountants and banking experts are also finding employment in the Persian Gulf states and other countries, while military experts including pilots are finding employment in Egypt and other Arab countries with top salaries.

CSO: 4920

URANIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE TO BE CANCELED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Sep 79 p 12

[Excerpt] The agreement for the purchase of uranium from France is being canceled.

After the cancellation of agreements to buy uranium from some African countries, including South Africa, negotiation has begun for the cancellation of similar agreements with some [companies of] the nation of France.

Dr. Sahabi, director of the Atomic Energy Corporation of Iran, who had an interview with Ettela'at, revealed the contents of the announcement of this matter:

With the dropping of projects to be implemented, including the establishment of atomic electric-power plants, the activities of the Atomic Energy Corporation are confined within new spheres to research, exploratory, and scientific work.

Likewise, the 4,500-man work force of the corporation is being reduced to a maximum of 1,400 persons. Up to the present about 1,200 people in various capacities (such as the agency for transfer and repurchase) have left the corporation.

On the matter of foreign investment and agreements, Sahabi said:

The idea of foreign investment is being dropped, but this does not mean that we will not countenance the nation's capital outside the country.

Our agreements with foreign countries were mostly for the purchase of uranium and the industry of enriching used uranium. Up to now most of these agreements with countries like Gabon, Niger, Namibia, and South Africa have been canceled.

For this reason we have been and are confronted with difficulties from the aspect of financial affairs which we are striving to solve with investigation and negotiation.

We also have other agreements in this area with some French companies, whose cancellation we are discussing and negotiating.

SENIORITY GRANTED IN CIVIL SERVICE FOR MILITARY SERVICE

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 29 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Khalid Shakir: "Military Service Instructions No 4 of the Year 1979"]

[Text] General 'Adnan Khayrallah, member of the Revolutionary Command Council, deputy prime minister and minister of defense issued military service instructions No 4 of the year 1979. The new instructions provide for granting conscripts who are graduates of colleges, institutes and elementary, preparatory and secondary schools a seniority for the purpose of promotion on the period of time they spend in compulsory military service, when applying for jobs in the civil service upon completion of the compulsory military service. This also applies to those who are now employed in civil service jobs who had not been given credit for their military service upon joining the civil service, provided that their recruitment had deprived them of the opportunity of employment in the civil service at the same time when their classmates who graduated with them in the same year were employed.

The new instructions provide for granting a second lieutenant a seniority not exceeding 6 months upon his employment in a civil service job, provided that his service as an officer is rated good. This is applicable to all such lieutenants who were discharged from the military service on 5 February 1979 or later. The new instructions substituted and annuled the military service instructions No 3 of the year 1978. Following is the text of the new instructions:

In accordance with Article 82 of the revised Military Service Law No 65 for the year 1969 and with the approval of the office of the secretariat of the Revolutionary Command Council--as stated in letter No 24 - 1 - 62, dated 7 January 1979--and to facilitate the application of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 26 of the abovementioned law, amended by law No 7 of the year 1979, we hereby issue the following instructions:

1. Conscripts who are graduates of colleges, institutes and elementary, preparatory and secondary schools or who have equivalent education, shall

be granted seniority for promotion purposes on the period of time they spend in compulsory military service, in accordance with the law and approval of the Revolutionary Command Council, as mentioned before, and upon applying for employment in any government department, agency or organization, following completion of their compulsory military service. The same applies to those who are already employed in a civil service job who were not given credit for their military service when first appointed, provided that their draft to the abovementioned service had deprived them of the opportunity of employment at the same time when other graduates of their classes had been employed. (The condition of the draft to the compulsory military service is met) upon meeting all the general requirements of employment in the civil service.

2. In addition to what is cited in the abovementioned paragraph 1, a second lieutenant shall be granted seniority for a period not exceeding 6 months upon his employment, provided that his service as a conscript officer in the army is rated good. The provision of good service is met with the support of the Ministry provided that:

a. The officer has not been tried and convicted, during his compulsory service, by the military tribunals (including the disciplinary commander court) or non-military courts.

b. His competence, during his compulsory service, as an officer has been confirmed.

3. a. The rules of the abovementioned paragraph 1 apply to all those who have completed their compulsory service, whether under the rules of the abovementioned law, or any other preceeding laws.

b. The rules of the abovementioned paragraph 2 apply to those among them who were discharged on 5 February 1979 or later, being the date when the abovementioned law was replaced by law No 7 of the year 1979.

4. The periods referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above are counted for purposes of non-military services and internal security services.

5. Military service instructions No 3 of the year 1978 are hereby annuled.

6800

CSO: 4802

KARBALA' GOVERNORATE ROAD PROJECTS

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 30 Aug 79 p 5

[Article: "Karbala' Governorate Scene of Great Development in All Aspects of Life"]

[Text] Following the 17 July Revolution, the Governorate of Karbala', distinguished for its religious, historical and touristic sites, has witnessed great development in all the fields of life. Special emphasis has been given to the field of road construction in order to make it easy for visitors and tourists to visit the governorate and to render the best public services to the farming families in the districts and subdistricts of the governorate.

16 Rural and Tourist Roads

Pursuant to this policy, plans have been drawn for the building of 16 roads with a total length of 600 kilometers at a cost of 26,170,000 Iraqi dinars. Out of these roads, six are rural, four are for tourists and the remaining roads are public roads.

So far eight roads have been constructed. Their total length is 233 kilometers. They include: Al-Thawrah al-Zira'iyah (Agricultural Revolution Road.) The 12 kilometer road links Karbala-- al-Hindiya Road with Karbala' - al-Hussayniya Road. It cost 230,000 dinars and is considered both a tourist and rural road.

Another such road is the rural Hur Road which is 15 kilometers long. Its cost amounted to 225,000 dinars. It links the center of the subdistrict with al-Kamaliyah district and links with the Karbala' - Baghdad Road. The two roads were built by the Directorate of Roads in the governorate which carried out the projects without delay.

Second Land for the Karbala' - Baghdad Road

The local administration of the Karbala' governorate also implemented two road projects: the first in 'Ayn Tamr district and the second in al-Hussayniya subdistrict. Each extends to 12 kilometers. Both road

projects were executed by the local people with the aid of the machines and equipment of the technical organizations in the governorate.

Four tourist roads have also been completed. The first road begins at Karbala' and extends to al-Razzazah Lake and from there to the ancient al-Ukhaydir Castle and to the center town of 'Ayn Tamr district. It is 85 kilometers long. Its costs amounted to 1.5 million dinars. The second road links between Karbala' and Nur subdistrict. It is 10 kilometers long and cost 135,000 dinars. The third road runs between Karbala' and al-Razzazah Lake. It is 12 kilometers long. Its costs amounted to 110,000 dinars. The fourth road is the tourist Ba'ath Road which begins at the square opposite to the Directorate of Education of the Governorate of Karbala' and links with the Karbala'-Hur subdistrict Road. The 10 km long road cost 60,000 dinars.

Meanwhile, the second lane for the Karbala' - Baghdad Road, extending to 54 kilometers and costing 2.5 million dinars has been completed. It begins at the provincial capital of Karbala', passes through al-Masib district and reaches al-Haswah subdistrict.

Another road project carried out directly by the governorate is the pilgrimage road which cost 10 million dinars. The 54 kilometer long road begins at the ancient al-Ukhaydir Castle, passes through al-Nakhib subdistrict to Judaydat 'Ar'ar and from there to the Saudi Arabian borders.

The Strategic Oil Pipeline Service Road

The Karbala' Governorate Directorate of Roads is currently carrying out the strategic oil pipeline service road project. This road will be 65 kilometers long and will cost one million dinars. It is also building the second lane of the Karbala' - Hilla Road, extending to 10 kilometers and costing 60,000 dinars.

Meanwhile, the local administration of the governorate is building two rural roads in Hindiya district. The first is al-Khayrat road, which is 12 kilometers long and costs 180,000 dinars. It will link Hindiya - Jadwal al-Gharbi road with al-Khayrat subdistrict. The second is al-Mushawrab Road, extending to 12 kilometers and costing 160,000 dinars. It will link Karbala' - Hindiya Road with the villages in al-Mushawrab and al-Da'um district and will join the abovementioned al-Thawrah al-Zira'iya Road. It is hoped that this project will be completed during the first half of next year.

6800

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW BRIDGES--The General Organization for Roads and Bridges will begin, late this year, the construction of 21 bridges for the passage of motor vehicles at seven points across the al-Jaysh Canal. An official source in the organization said that the surveys and plans for the project had been completed. The project aims at facilitating traffic across the canal and coping with the expected traffic to this area following the opening of al-Muthanna Bin Haritha al-Shaybani Bridge and al-Dawrah Bridge. Both bridges are under construction. The project will also contribute to the reduction of traffic jams and traffic accidents in the area. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 27 Aug 79 p 4] 6800

BAMARNI AIRPORT--The General Organization for Roads and Bridges has started the construction of the new Bamarani Airport in the northern region of Iraq. A responsible source in the organization said that the project would include the establishment of a parking area for the planes and a 2,500-meter long and 45-meter wide runway to receive the Boeing 707, 727, and 737 aircrafts and other smaller planes. It also would include the construction of a passengers terminal with a reception hall, two halls for arrivals and departures, another hall for delegations, a restaurant, shops, various service facilities and a parking lot for cars. The airport, located at the crossroads leading to the summer resorts of Sarsank, Ardan and Tanni, would be used mainly for tourist purposes and to facilitate traffic from and to the northern region. It is worth noting here that work has recently begun on the construction of the Baghdad International Airport in Baghdad. This project is part of a plan calling for the construction of several airports in the country. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 28 Aug 79 p 4] 6800

QAYARAH REFINERY--The experimental operation of the project for increasing the annual production capacity of Qayarah Refinery to 300,000 tons of asphalt, will begin next September. The 3.5 million dinar project includes a refining unit with a production capacity of 120,000 tons of asphalt annually, a complex of storage facilities for the petroleum products, a platform for loading and unloading trucks, a tower for cooling treated water and a steam boiler. The refining unit will annually produce, as a byproduct, 40,000 tons of gasoil which is used as fuel for the immovable engines, 10,000 tons of light gasoil and 12,000 tons of gasoline used

in operating the project. Engineer Azad Nori, director of the expansion project said that the volume of surpluses from the gasoil and gasoline products would be doubled when the expansions are put under normal operation next December. At that time there will be a daily surplus of 500 barrels which will be shipped to Biji Refinery for processing, instead of burning them, as was done in the past. The director also said that the technical cadres in the General Organization for Oil Refining and Gas Industry had assumed the responsibility of implementing civil works, examining the specifications and measurements, supervising and recommending changes in the operation of the project to suit the work conditions in the other units of the Qayarah Refinery. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 28 Aug 79 p 4] 6800

CSO: 4802

FRG FOREIGN MINISTER VISIT TO JORDAN ANALYZED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 10 Sep 79 p 28

/Article by Bassam Haddadin: "What Merchandise Will Turn Up After the Unusually Friendly Reception Given to the German Guest?"

/Text/ The unusually friendly reception which was extended by Jordanian officials to Hans Genscher, West Germany's foreign minister, during his recent visit to Amman, attracted people's attention. The German minister was received and had individual and group discussions with King Husayn, Crown Prince Hasan, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the minister of information, and high Jordanian officials. It was the statement by 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, the Jordanian minister of information, to reporters after the conclusion of the Jordanian-West German talks that revealed the secret of this interest and friendly reception. Abu 'Awdah announced to the reporters that "there is agreement in our points of view concerning the principles that would guarantee arriving at a just and permanent settlement for the Middle East crisis." The Jordanian minister continued, saying: "As for the means and methods of arriving at this settlement, both parties exchanged views concerning this, and the discussions on this subject were useful and constructive." And if we remember that West Germany is the Western country which is the most unreservedly enthusiastic about the Camp David agreement and the principles on which the agreement is based, and if we remember that its government, among all the Western governments, is the one most closely tied to the United States, and represents it and is its spokesman in the European Common Market, then it becomes easy to discover the mission of the German minister at this stage, during which the American-Israeli-Egyptian "peace" process is stumbling. We can then discover West Germany's enterprising, active role in the creation of new loopholes, on the basis of Camp David, which would enable the other parties, including Jordan, to get bogged down in the quagmire of the American settlement. The Jordanian Government has always kept the doors open to the United States and its allies in Western Europe and has continued its rapid efforts to entice new proposals via the Western European countries, in particular with the cooperation of the Arab reactionary nations and Saudi Arabia. And the Jordanian Government has continually promoted a "new international initiative" and the possibility of "opening the doors to a new settlement," and continually talked about "America discovering its mistake at Camp David," etc. It is this policy of Jordan that is behind the Jordanian enthusiasm for

the mission undertaken in the area by Genscher, West Germany's foreign minister. Jordan's prime minister clearly showed this when he expressed his "appreciation for the role played by West Germany and the European countries in their efforts to bring the /Middle East/ problem back into an international framework and to create a suitable method of pushing the issue toward a permanent, comprehensive solution." And the German minister did not fail to emphasize Jordan's role in the area, "which is helpful in the crystalization of a realistic, responsible policy."

Through an examination of the statements made by Genscher during his tour of some of the Arab countries, one clearly discovers the chief elements of what the German envoy to the area is trying to sell to it and what it is that found a warm reception and "agreement in points of view" with the Jordanian officials.

On the occasion of his reply to Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, the foreign minister of Syria, who attacked American policy in the area the treasonous Camp David agreement, Mr Genscher impudently defended American policy in the area and Sadat's Egypt, calling for an end to /the policy of/ isolation of it and for joining it in its "peace" initiatives toward a solution of the Middle East crisis. Mr Genscher, addressing his words to the Syrian foreign minister, said: "I cannot agree with your appraisal of the aims of American policy. And perhaps it would be suitable to remind you that the American are our closest friends." He continued: "Egypt is also a friendly nation," and emphasized "the necessity of uniting the positions of the friendly countries, including Egypt, vis-a-vis the peace initiatives in the Middle East." Jordan's approaching the German minister Genscher's mission with open arms very clearly reveals the continuation of the official Jordanian policy which is to pursue the American settlement and to be ready to plunge into it in case some of its conditions are improved, so that it can be pushed through both on the local and the pan-Arab level. The thing that emphasizes the continuation of this path is the policy of repression and maltreatment practiced by the Jordanian regime against the patriotic, popular forces which reject the treasonous agreement, and the regime's continual refusal to correct its relationship with the PLO, putting it on bases that would guarantee the PLO its ability to undertake its role of resisting the treasonous agreement. And the regime restricts its relationship with the PLO to the framework of discussing how to distribute funds for supporting the resistance, and under the aegis of the Jordanian-Palestinian Committee for Supporting the Resistance the Jordanian Government is trying to direct the resistance funds toward strengthening the role of the reactionary elements and forces in the occupied areas which are known for their loyalty to the Jordanian regime.

WHEAT SHORTAGE LEADS TO DEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN AID

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 20 Sep 79 p 28

[Article: "The Loaf of Bread and the Policy of Depending on Foreign Aid"]

[Text] About 2 months ago it became evident from the National Advisory Council's debate concerning the "government's agricultural policy" that the measures which will be taken by the government to confront the season on severe drought which different agricultural areas of the country are suffering from this year, and to confront its destructive effects on the situation of tens of thousands of poor peasants and their families, will be limited to turning to foreign countries--America, to be exact--and foreign organizations with their request for aid and assistance.

Now, after the conclusion of the harvest season for most of the crops, the most important of which is wheat, which is the population's basic food item, the policy and measures of the "new-old" government--which can be summed up as ever increasing dependence on foreign aid and cash and commodity loans in order to "solve" the country's economic problems--have only led Jordan to the brink of real famine and led to a situation in which tens of thousands of small, poor peasant families are being left exposed to hunger and the danger of losing their lands to certain parasitic groups of people who are dominant in the countryside.

The Jordanian population's needs in terms of wheat are estimated at about 350,000 tons this year, at a time when the severe season of drought has led to a sinking of the production level of various crops down to less than 40 percent of the normal yearly production, such that the production level of wheat, the main crop, has gone down to only 20,000 tons. The "measures" taken by the government to confront this situation have amounted only to providing a small portion of the foodstuffs necessary to cover the population's nutritional needs. The aid and donations received so far from foreign countries and foreign and international organizations have amounted to only 28,000 tons of wheat and various foodstuffs which are worth 7 million dollars. In addition to this there are the quantities of "wheat" in the annual American aid program to Jordan which, at best, will not total more than 70,000 tons.

JORDAN

BRIEFS

SOUTH KOREAN COMPANY--The contract to build the new Arab Bank administration building in Amman went to a South Korean company which will undertake to import its workers and specialists from abroad. Less than 2 weeks after the Jordanian Engineers' chairman accused the foreign companies operating in Jordan of trying to rob the country of its resources, combat national industry, of contributing greatly toward increasing the migration of qualified Jordanian personnel and workers to other countries, in addition to the great negative influence of their role in the country's economic life, the administration of the Arab Bank--a Jordanian corporation, the main headquarters of which is in Amman and all of whose stockholders are Arabs--announced that the designing of the new bank building has been completed and that the contract for building this "lofty edifice" has gone to a South Korean contracting company. It is evident, from what the Arab Bank administration has announced concerning its plan, that the new building will consist of five floors underground and seven other floors above ground. The building's area will be 18,557 square meters, with a cost of 250 dinars per square meter, i.e., the cost of the building alone will total about 5 million dollars. In addition to the fact that the contract for putting up this building, which is considered one of the largest and most modern buildings in the Jordanian capital, went to a foreign contracting company, the contract which has already been signed by the administration of the Arab Bank and the Korean company contains a clause which stipulates that the company undertake to import its workers and specialists, as well as all the necessary equipment, from abroad. [Text] /Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 10 Sep 79 pp 28-29/ 9468

CSO: 4802

TERMS OF TRADE WITH INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD WORSEN

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Oct 79 pp 3-5

[Text]

Terms of trade in 1978 were unfavourable to Kuwait because of higher prices for imports and falling oil prices, according to the Central Bank of Kuwait's *Economic Report for 1978* published last month. The report shows that although Kuwait's balance of trade showed an increase of about 14 per cent in its surplus from KD 1.405 billion in 1977 to KD 1.602 billion in 1978 (1 Kuwaiti Dinar = \$3.64), terms of trade deteriorated by an average of 11.2 per cent in favour of other countries.

The increase in the balance was due mainly to a 21.9 per cent increase in imports last year when compared with 1977, coupled with a rise in exports of 3 per cent, the worsening in terms of trade, the report concludes, was due to an increase of 10 per cent in the cost of imports together with a reduction in both real and official prices for oil. Kuwait's import bill was KD 1.387 billion in 1977 (up from KD 972 million in 1976) but fell to KD 1.268 billion last year.

According to the bank, the deficit incurred by industrial nations in their trade with Kuwait has shown a steady decline over the past six years. Trading with these countries accounted for 67 per cent of Kuwait's surplus in 1974 but had fallen to 42 per cent in 1977. The report attributes this decline to the continuous but decelerating growth in imports by Kuwait from these countries. Industrial countries accounted for 60 per cent of Kuwait's imports in 1975 but only 39 per cent in 1976 and 1977.

Japan tops the list of countries to which Kuwait sells more than it buys. Japan was responsible for 23 per cent of the Kuwaiti surplus in 1976, 30 per cent in 1977 and 28 per cent in 1978, the report reveals. By contrast, the US was the top nation among countries with which Kuwait was in deficit. This amounted to 10 per cent of the debit side of the balance in 1977 and 8 per cent last year because the growth of Kuwaiti exports to the US has been modest while imports of American goods have increased significantly.

Value of oil exports up 2.8 per cent last year

The dominance of oil in Kuwaiti exports increased from 91 per cent in 1977 to 92 per cent in 1978, with the value of exports rising by 2.8 per cent last year. This was due basically to a rise of 8.8 per cent in the volume of oil exports which was counteracted, however, by an average decline of 1.1 per cent in official oil prices, when compared with 1977 prices, coupled with a 4.3 per cent depreciation in the value of the dollar in terms of the Kuwaiti Dinar last year. Oil exports were worth KD 2.638 billion last year out of total exports of KD 2.871 billion.

Non-oil exports were worth KD 233.3 million last year, with KD 64.4 million of this coming from exports of Kuwaiti origin and KD 168.9 from re-exports. Exports of Kuwaiti origin were worth KD 58.1 million in 1977 and KD 56.6 million the previous year; re-exports in 1977 amounted to KD 177.4 million and KD 159 million in 1976.

Exports of processed and manufactured goods from Kuwait registered an increase of 11 per cent last year following an increase of only 3 per cent in 1977 and a decline of 31 per cent the previous year. Fertilisers were the largest single non-oil exports and the rise in exports of fertilisers last year was due to a combination of a 19 per cent increase in volume and a rise of 18 per cent in the price of urea. Kuwait markets its fertilisers mainly in China, India, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Sudan.

Kuwait's exports of metal pipes suffered a precipitous fall last year, dropping by 92 per cent when compared with those in 1977. The report attributes the fall to a slowdown in foreign demand and a 10 per cent decrease in world prices.

It is noteworthy that there has been a decline in the share of Kuwait's total exports going to countries of the European Economic Community. Exports to EEC countries accounted for 34 per cent of Kuwait's exports last year compared with 40 per cent in 1974, the result of lower oil exports to Europe, in particular to France.

The report shows there has been a constant growth in value of imports since 1974. They were up by 47 per cent that year when compared with 1973, by 52 per cent in 1975, 40 per cent in 1976 and 43 per cent in 1977. The factors underlying these increases has been a persistent rise in the price of imports and the continuous growth in demand for both consumer and

capital goods, stemming from the expansion of construction and development projects, in terms of volume, the increases have been more modest: 22 per cent in 1974, 35 per cent in 1975, 37 per cent in 1976 and 22.6 per cent in 1977. The trend was reversed, however, in 1978 because of the reduction in imports.

The bank's report attributes the fall in imports to four major factors: 1) the Kuwaiti economy's limited absorptive capacity and the stagnation of some economic sectors; 2) commodities stockpiled early in 1978 were sufficient to cover domestic demand, leading to a 6 per cent decline in the number of letters of credit opened during the first three quarters of last year; 3) a fall of 46 per cent in the documentary credits opened by the Central Bank for ministries and official agencies as a result of the budget policy of rationalisation of public expenditures during the 1978-79 fiscal year; and 4) the fall of about 13 per cent in goods imported into Kuwait for re-export when compared with 1977 because of the decongestion of ports in neighbouring states and the improvement in Gulf port facilities.

According to the report, the bias towards imports of capital goods has continued. Capital goods accounted for 24 per cent of total imports last year compared with 15 per cent in 1972 and imports of consumer goods during the same period have dropped from 49 per cent of total imports in 1972 to 41 per cent last year.

Asian countries now rank as the prime source of Kuwaiti imports, with Japan alone selling 20 per cent of all the goods Kuwait buys from abroad. Britain comes next, followed by West Germany and the U.S. with American goods accounting for 14 per cent of total imports.

The report shows that the Central Bank considers that Kuwait's external trade is compatible with its policy of seeking to secure basic consumer goods at reasonable prices and protection of local production. This policy, the report notes, entails prohibiting exports of some goods required for domestic purposes and the exemption from customs duties of foodstuffs, industrial plant and equipment, raw materials and spare parts as well as a ban on imports of products that would compete with those of Kuwait's infant industries. The policy also involves regulating imports and prices of some basic commodities to ensure that they are available in Kuwait at prices that ordinary Kuwaitis can afford.

SHI'ITE LEADER INTERVIEWED ON SOUTH LEBANON

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 1-7 Oct 79 pp 26-31

[Interview with Shaykh Mahdi Shams-al-Din, vice chairman of Shi'ite Higher Council, by Mona es-Said no date or place given]

[Text] I asked the vice chairman of the Higher Shiite Council whether he believed that the South Lebanese situation had sown the seeds of a Shiite "revolution" in Lebanon, and his answer was not reassuring:

"Do we have the seeds of an Islamic Shiite revolution?" he said. "I wonder. The truth is that it depends on the response to the fears that fill our hearts, to our concern for our people, be they Shiite or non-Shiite.

"If the lives of the Southerners continue to be harvested by the dangers of the South, and if those dangers continue to threaten the land of the South and the fate of its people, I cannot predict what will happen."

The Shiite leader, Sheikh Mehdi Shamseddin, was talking to me at the end of a "South Lebanon Week" organized by the Higher Shiite Council and the *ulema* of the Shiite community.

The Week was launched to draw attention to a list of Shiite demands for the South - particularly a demand for the return of Lebanese government authority, including the Lebanese Army, to all parts of the war-battered region.

Noting that the deployment of the Army in the South must be undertaken within a certain "political framework" which would avert any adverse reactions that might make the deployment impossible or continued Army presence in the South difficult, Shamseddin said he had no particular frameworks to suggest.

"The important thing," he said, "is that we are now facing a popular... demand for the deployment of the Army to guarantee a minimum level of security for the people of the South. It is in everyone's interest that this demand be heard and met. All

parties concerned, the State as well as other parties, must find the appropriate formula to meet this demand."

When the Army is deployed in the South, I asked, should its duties be limited to internal security, or should it also take on any Israelis that try to attack the South?

Shamseddin said the Army's role in the confrontation with Israel should be decided by the Lebanese State, but the decision should be taken in the light of the unified Arab strategy which Lebanon is demanding on South Lebanon.

"We demand," the Shiite leader said, "that a clear and serious Arab strategy be defined in which Lebanon should play a distinctive role. We insist that Lebanon's role be a different, exceptional one."

He added: "If no such strategy is defined, we ask the Arab Kings and Presidents to tell us what to do: Do we sacrifice the South, and by so doing give Israel another card to bargain with? Or do we keep the South a Lebanese Arab territory until they, in their wisdom and according to their abilities, decide that the time has come for confrontation? ... What is needed is either a confrontation strategy which would assign a role to every Arab country capable of playing one, or an alternative which would preserve the South and its security pending the definition of such a strategy."

The subject of Army deployment in the South - particularly the towns of Tyre and Nabatiyeh, which are under the control of the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese leftist forces - was the focus of recent talks between Lebanese and Palestinian officials. Informed sources have said that the Palestinians have agreed to pull out of the two major Southern towns to make way for the Army, and Premier Selim Hoss has said that a definite decision has been taken to deploy the Army in the South in the near future.

Shamseddin said he believed that the deployment of the Army would encourage the people of the South to return to it, especially if they were provided with other facilities to help them withstand the pressure of Israeli attacks.

The Shiite leader said he believed that Israel would continue its attacks on the South even in the absence of the Palestinian Resistance, because the Jewish state's aim was not only to fight the Palestinians, but also to undermine the State of Lebanon, which he called the "antithesis" of Israel.

There can be no total security in the South or other areas bordering Israel, Shamseddin said, but "we aspire to a reasonable measure of normal life which would protect the South - and

therefore Lebanon, and therefore the Arabs – from the dangers posed." The Southerners must be provided "with the elements of steadfastness, the elements which would enable them to tolerate a reasonable measure of harm," he said.

Since the disappearance of Imam Mousa Sadr, president of the Higher Shiite Council, last August, Shamseddin has been regarded as the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shiite community. Sadr vanished shortly after arriving in Tripoli on an official visit. Shamseddin told me he had evidence that Sadr did not leave Libya when the Libyan authorities claim he did, but he had no evidence that he was killed or that he was still alive.

In the absence of proof of his death, he said, the Shiite community would not despair. The Shiite Council would continue its efforts to find him, but those efforts, in view of the nature of the Council, must be limited to political and diplomatic channels. Beyond those limits, any action to seek the return of the Imam or an explanation of the crime must be undertaken by the Lebanese authorities, the Iranian authorities and "at least some Arab states."

Shamseddin said the matter was now before the courts, and in the light of the verdict the courts issue, the Lebanese State must take the appropriate action.

The full interview:

How do you evaluate the reaction of the various Lebanese regions to the South Lebanon Week which the Higher Shiite Council organized last week?

I believe all the Lebanese regions support the aims of the Week of the South as we announced them, although various people express their approval in different ways. I say this because I am confident that South Lebanon is in the heart of every Lebanese and every Arab, and that its suffering is shared by everyone. The South Lebanon issue is definitely not the concern of the South Lebanese people alone. The Southerners are suffering more than others, naturally, since they are the people who are being shelled, dispersed and displaced, but since

they are Lebanese citizens, one presumes that all of Lebanon is suffering with them.

The demands you made when you launched the Week of the South included: (1) construction of shelters in Southern towns and villages, (2) deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South, including the Southern border strip, which you described as 'quasi-occupied,' (3) political action to facilitate the return of the Southern refugees to their homes, (4) an Arab summit conference on South Lebanon, to work out a rescue plan for it, and (5) disengagement of the South Lebanese and Middle Eastern problems. The

question is, do you feel these demands can be met?

What we are trying to do is give the Lebanese State and Arab officials the incentives to achieve those goals. As for how these goals can be achieved – all I can say, in brief, is that we have confidence in the Lebanese State and in our Arab brothers, especially those who have demonstrated a great sense of responsibility toward what is happening in Lebanon; those whose political and material resources enable them to do something for Lebanon on the Arab and international levels. Those are more qualified than we are to decide on the appropriate measures.

What we, the Higher Islamic Shiite Council, wanted to do was to draw attention to the problem and the dangers involved in its continuation, to provide incentives for the search for the solutions.

But do you really believe the Lebanese government can meet all those demands?

The Lebanese State as it stands today would, of course, need help to be able to meet those demands. We know, and the Lebanese authorities know, that the Lebanese problem cannot be solved without the cooperation of all the Arabs, because the political complications which led to the South Lebanese developments have dimensions that go beyond Lebanon.

Take the practical demand for shelters for the Southerners. Do you think the Lebanese government has the funds to build those shelters? And is the object to make the South better equipped for "steadfastness and confrontation"?

Where the government will get the

funds is the government's problem, since it is the government, is the party responsible for such matters.

As for confrontation, that is a matter which depends on what joint position the Arab states adopt... The object of the shelters and other measures is to bolster the steadfastness of the South Lebanese citizen in the face of the aggression against him – his steadfastness in his home and his field, not in Beirut or any other place outside the South.

Perhaps the Lebanese government does not have enough funds to build all the shelters at once. But it can work out a priority program and implement it gradually, with the resources available to it, and with the resources available to the Arab countries, because the Arab countries have great responsibilities in this regard and they, or at least some of them, always say they are aware of these responsibilities.

How do you think the Army can enter the South, including the Southern border strip, when the U.N. troops, along with the Lebanese Army battalion stationed with them, have been unable to do so?

We in the Council do not work out formulas for Army deployment. The deployment of the Army must be undertaken within a political framework, and there are various difficulties involved in working out this framework.

With the help of all the political forces that cooperate with us in this country, we are trying to urge the parties concerned, including the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Resistance, to find the political framework for Army deployment in the South.

The factors involved in Army deployment in the South are subject to change.

These factors now need to be reconsidered with a view to finding the appropriate formula for Army deployment – a formula that would not trigger reactions which would make the deployment impossible, or make the maintenance of Army presence after deployment difficult.

The political and military specialists are more qualified to study those factors and arrive at a conclusion than I am.

The important thing is that we are now facing a popular need – a popular aspiration, desire, demand – for the deployment of the Army to guarantee a minimum level of security for the people of the South. It is in everyone's interest that this demand be heard and met. All parties concerned, the State as well as other parties, must find the appropriate formula to meet this demand. I have no formulas, and I will suggest none. My duty is to express the desire and the will of the people. The desire is not impossible to satisfy. As for how it should be satisfied – that is up to the parties who are capable of taking the appropriate executive decisions on this matter.

Judging by what has been said and done so far, do you expect the Army to be deployed in the South in the near future?

There are some positive signs emerging – signs that the seriousness and earnestness of this popular demand is being understood. I expect the signs to take more concrete shape, and the understanding to become deeper, reflecting itself in efforts to meet the demand. But we must not expect instant miracles. The realization of such demands is usually slow, but the important thing is for the decision to be taken and for its implementation to

start, with good faith on the part of all parties concerned.

Is the object of Army deployment in the South the protection of that area against Israeli attacks or the control of the internal security situation?

The main aim, really, is to reimpose government authority in all parts of the country and on all citizens. The people of the South must be given the feeling that there is a Lebanese State, and that the institutions of that State are present and fully effective among them. This would give the people the incentive to return to their homes and be steadfast. The return of the Southerners to the South is in itself a very important demand, since their return would provide guarantees against occupation and partition.

As for whether the Lebanese Army's duties in the South will include confrontation with Israel and action against Israeli aggression, or what the Army's role will be in this regard – that is a matter that is up to the State to decide. And the decision, I believe, should be a function of the Arab strategy we are demanding. We demand that a clear and serious Arab strategy be defined, in which Lebanon should play a distinctive role. We insist that Lebanon's role be a different, exceptional one.

Our aim, then, is to restore government authority. And this right, to which every country and every citizen is entitled, will, once it is achieved, provide incentives for the displaced people to return and for those who are still in the South to remain there, thus returning the Southern territory to the Lebanese authorities, along

with as many of its people as possible.

We realize that there are many difficulties preventing the return of 100 percent normalcy to the South, but we refuse to have the South remain as it is today - 100 percent abnormal. We aspire to a reasonable measure of normal life, which would protect the South - and therefore Lebanon, and therefore the Arabs - from the dangers posed.

What political action are you demanding to induce the Southerners to return to their towns and villages?

The political action we are demanding is the return of the Army and efforts on the part of the State to do its duty and provide the Southerners with the elements of steadfastness, the elements which would enable the Southerners to tolerate a reasonable measure of harm.

We are confident that when the legal institutions return to the South, large numbers of Southerners will voluntarily go back to their homes, because no Southerner likes to remain displaced and have his family dispersed. The Southerners are known for their love of their land. It is known about them that although they may emigrate and stay away for years, they inevitably return to their land and their people in the South.

So everything depends on the deployment of the Army?

Everything depends on the return of the State - through the deployment of the Army and the rebuilding of the State administration in the South. I don't expect any Southerner to return if the Army is not there; on the contrary, if the situation remains as it is today, I expect the migration wave to swell.

What exactly do you want the Arabs to do? Are they required to provide a "steadfastness and confrontation" plan - and therefore to supply arms, armies and funds? Or do you want them to come up with a plan to disengage the South Lebanese and Middle Eastern problems?

We have called for an Arab summit conference in which an Arab strategy can be defined, not for South Lebanon alone, not for Lebanon alone, but for the Arab world in general - a unified Arab strategy to confront the enemy. All action should from then on be based on that strategy, and whatever the implementation of the strategy requires in terms of funds, arms and men should be provided.

If no such strategy is defined, we ask the Arab Kings and Presidents to tell us what to do: Do we sacrifice the South, and by so doing give Israel another card to bargain with? Or do we keep the South a Lebanese Arab territory until they, in their wisdom and according to their capabilities, decide that the time has come for confrontation?

What is required of the Arabs is a clear position on South Lebanon. What we have now is an Arab non-position. There is no real Arab position on the South. There are the fate of the South.

What is needed is either a confrontation strategy which would assign a role to every Arab country capable of playing one, or an alternative which would preserve the South and its security pending the definition of such a strategy.

Do you think it is possible to disengage the South Lebanese and Middle Eastern crises?

That depends on many factors and

many intentions. Foremost among the prerequisites to disengagement is a national accord which would make a unified Lebanese attitude toward the Southern problem possible. The matter also depends on a variety of Arab factors, which should be discussed in the summit conference we have called for.

We are still hoping that a special summit conference will be held to discuss the South. But if, as it seems now, there is no time to hold a special summit on the South, and if the South is discussed at the summit which will be held toward the end of the year, one of the points that should be discussed is the matter of disengaging the two problems, because it is our view that disengagement would be beneficial for both.

Israel attacks the South whenever a bomb explodes in Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv or anywhere else. What, in your view, are Israel's motives? And how do you think its attacks can be stopped?

We believe the motives of Israel's continuous aggression on the South go beyond the announced and inadequate pretexts of Palestinian presence or the presence of military activity.

Israel attacks Lebanon because Lebanon is its human and civilizational antithesis. It attacks Lebanon because the Lebanese coexistence formula, which came into being by the convergence of the wills of a variety of faiths and cultures, contradicts the Israeli racist formula. So if the Palestinians weren't here, Israel would have found some other pretext for open or veiled aggression against Lebanon, to prove to the world that open civilizational formulas are impractical, and that the practical formula is

the ghetto formula which places each faith in a separate political entity independent of the other faiths. This would allow international powers, whatever powers they may be, to achieve their goals in our region. The great diversity of elements and cultures that has developed in the Middle East region over the ages can, given such a formula, undermine every political entity in the region, and perhaps beyond it.

So even in the absence of the Palestinians, you believe that Israel would continue to attack Lebanon?

It would find another pretext to undermine this successful formula, which has a political future, in my opinion.

It is my view that the world, by creating Israel, has created a devil from which greater evil than the world has yet seen will issue. If the international community does not come to its senses in time, the Israeli poison will spread and affect the entire world. By the immoral deed of creating Israel — for there is nothing moral in dispersing the Palestinian people — the East and the West have created circumstances which have sapped the strength of the region and brought political and economic gains for themselves (the Eastern and Western worlds), but they have also created a great evil which will in the final analysis turn on them. That is my belief.

What do you think should be done to avert the Israeli threat?

As I told you, I don't expect stable, solid and continuous peace for the South, or Lebanon, or any of Israel's neighbors. What we are looking for is a formula which would enable us to stand steadfast pending a decision from the Arab coun-

tries which have the power to make decisions. In the presence of Israel, Lebanon cannot achieve total security for itself.

Do you agree with Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, who says that Palestinian armed presence in the South is a card in the hands of Israel?

I believe I have answered this question: The enemy is not looking for real "cards"; he is looking for any pretext to undermine Lebanon's coexistence formula and national structure.

There was armed Palestinian presence in other Arab countries, and there still is in some, but Israel does not attack those countries. There is no doubt that some Palestinian commando operations against Israel originate in other Arab countries, but Israel punishes South Lebanon for them. Because Israel's aim is not only to fight the Palestinians – which is definitely one of its aims – but also to strike at this part of the Arab world, with a view to creating the political circumstances that suit it in Lebanon and in other parts of the region, and with a view to destroying any element of success for the Lebanese formula.

We notice that the Shiite ulama are often demonstrating more active interest in the Southern situation than the Shiite politicians and members of Parliament. Some have seen in this the seeds of an Islamic Shiite revolution under the leadership of the ulama in Lebanon. Would you agree?

I don't believe your question is accurate. The greatest wound Lebanon is suffering from now is the wound in the South. Active interest in it is being shown

by everyone. I like to believe that most if not all Lebanese politicians, be they Shiite or non-Shiite, are working for the South, each in his own way.

The Shiite ulama, who are dealing with this situation through the Higher Shiite Council and under its leadership, are dealing with it on the basis of their close daily contact with the people, the people's concerns and the people's views. They share, and have always shared, the human suffering of the environment in which they work. And because their education, their faith and their commitment do not allow them to use the usual political approaches, they use the simple, honest, direct approach. This is why their dealing with the matter is more visible to the people than it would have been had they used the usual political methods.

Do we have the seeds of an Islamic Shiite revolution? I wonder. The truth is that it depends on the response to the fears that fill our hearts, to our concern for our people, be they Shiite or non-Shiite. If the lives of the Southerners continue to be harvested by the dangers of the South, and if those dangers continue to threaten the land of the South and the fate of its people, I cannot predict what will happen.

Judging by your contacts with Ayatullah Khomeiny and other Islamic leaders in Iran, what support do you think Iran can provide for the South?

We have repeatedly noticed that the South – as a confrontation area, and in view of the dangers besetting it and the tragedies it is suffering – is the subject of Imam Khomeiny's great concern, and the concern of all political and spiritual leaders in Iran.

As for the support, what we expect from Iran is political support to help the Lebanese State reestablish its authority in the South, to restore the elements of legality in it, to bring its people back to it, and to enable them to withstand the dangers we have talked about. We aspire for no support from Iran other than that, and I believe that the Iranians are fully aware of their duty in this regard. Perhaps certain internal considerations and their preoccupation with the rebuilding of their state has delayed a concrete expression of this commitment, but it will definitely come.

You are still demanding the release of Imam Mousa Sadr. Do you have any evidence that he is still alive, or any clue as to why and where he is being held?

As I said in my press conference at the end of August, I have not lost hope. I have no concrete evidence or proof in the legal sense of the words, but my brothers and I have not yet reached the point of despair regarding his life and safety. We still have some hope. Whether that hope is small or great, it is enough to keep us from despairing. We believe he is in Libya, held by the Libyan authorities. We can say no more, because we know no more. We are demanding his release because we have not lost our hope that he is still alive. At any rate, we demand an explanation of why this crime was committed and what its perpetrators' motives were.

In this connection, I might mention that Imam Sadr's tour of the Arab countries last year - the tour that ended

with that ill-starred trip to Libya - was motivated by one issue: he carried with him the issue of Lebanon in general and, in particular, the issue of how to protect the South from dangers which we have seen grow so much since his disappearance.

Why did this happen? As I have said before, the question should be put to the criminal, not to the victim. We ourselves know of no reason that might in any way justify this crime...

We have proof that he did not leave Libya on the date the Libyans say he left. We have statements from Arab kings and rulers agreeing with us that he was abducted and imprisoned in Libya. We have the analysis of the available information - the analysis of the Libyan file itself - which refutes all Libyan claims. Those claims are also refuted by the wide-scale, detailed and very intelligent investigation conducted by the Italian authorities. Where this matter is concerned, there is no doubt left; indeed, all doubt was eliminated in the first few weeks after his disappearance.

As for whether he is still alive, all I can say is that we have no evidence that he has been martyred, and that being so, we have not lost hope. On this matter, I can make no positive statements. I can only make a negative statement: I have not despaired.

How do you intend to follow up on this issue?

As a Shiite Council, a religious-cultural-political institution, we can only follow it up through diplomatic and political means. We have no other means at our disposal.

Where security measures are concerned, any question regarding such measures should not be posed to us as an institution. We do not take such measures. However, since Imam Sadr is a Lebanese citizen and the president of a major Lebanese institution, the Lebanese State will definitely adopt a position. There is no doubt that the Iranian State will also adopt a position. A position is likewise expected from at least some Arab states.

As for us, our action has limitations beyond which we cannot go. Anything beyond those limitations becomes the responsibility of the State - its responsibility toward a prominent Lebanese citizen who has been the victim of a crime.

The court will soon issue its verdict on this matter, and the State will then have to act in the light of that verdict.

CSO: 4820

LIBYA READY TO REPLACE IRAQ IN FINANCING NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 10-16 Sep 79 p 7

[Article: "Libya Replaces Iraq in Financing the National Movement"]

[Text] In a press interview given before leaving on a tour of Arab countries, Col Mu'ammarr Qadhafi said that he was willing to extend assistance to every Lebanese group, and that it was unfair to accuse the entire Lebanese Front of collaborating with Israel. Political observers were quick to note that Colonel Qadhafi's statement indicated a qualitative change in Libya's policy toward the Lebanese crisis. Had it not been for the strike in some parts of Lebanon--which came in response to a call by the Amal Organization and other alienated groups--Colonel Qadhafi would have included Lebanon in his tour and perhaps would have used the opportunity to clarify the nature of his message, which was reported by the media. The result is that the invitation received no further clarification and was limited to a simple announcement. To date, Colonel Qadhafi's promise has neither been withdrawn nor translated into action, as evidenced by the fact that none of the factions representing the Lebanese Front has been invited to attend the celebrations commemorating the September revolution. Instead, an invitation was extended to all sectors of the National Movement. The overwhelming response to the strike called by the other factions--ostensibly to mark the first anniversary of Imam Musa al'Sadr's disappearance--thus appears to have clouded Lebanese-Libyan relations.

On the eve of the National Movement delegation's departure for Libya to participate in the celebrations, however, the Ba'th party had already announced that it was freezing membership in the party's political council. According to rumors at the time, this decision came on the heels of a decision by the Iraqi Government to halt further aid to the National Movement. Reports from Libya indicated that Col Mu'ammarr Qadhafi was careful to extend special hospitality to the chairman of the Progressive Socialist Party, Mr Walid Junblat, and to treat him as the head of an official delegation. The secretary of Lebanon's Ba'th Party, Mr 'Asim Qanawah is reported to have been accorded similar treatment. News reports from Libya also indicate that Colonel Qadhafi had decided to discuss aid to the

National Movement, giving rise to speculation that Libya was once again ready to replace Iraq in supporting the National Movement in Lebanon. However, now that the Ba'th party has rescinded its decision to freeze membership in the political council, and with growing indications that Iraq may resume its aid program, observers are wondering whether Libya will go ahead with its promise of financial support or will begin a new initiative aimed at dialog with all Lebanese factions. It appears, however, that this possibility is remote, at least for now.

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CSO: 4802

NATION TO UNDERGO MOST CRITICAL PHASE IN COMING MONTHS

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Sep 79 p 5

[Article by Howard Schissel: "Mauritania and the Necessity of Peace"]

[Text] By signing a peace treaty with the POLISARIO Front in Algiers on 5 August, Mr Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla's new Mauritanian Government ended a conflict which set the Mauritanian and Saharan peoples, linked by centuries of common history and united by the same traditions and language, against each other for 4 years in a very artificial way. Mauritania has now withdrawn from the war in Western Sahara and by making that decision the Military Committee for National Welfare (CMN) has done nothing other than to implement a plan at the root of the July 1978 military coup d'etat which overthrew President Moktar Ould Daddah.¹ At the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in Monrovia in July, the Mauritanian delegation had already stood apart from Rabat by voting in favor of a referendum on the unity of Western Sahara territory. The peace treaty subsequently concluded with the Saharans nullifies the 1975 Madrid agreement which served as a "legal framework" to justify the occupation and annexation of the former Spanish colony.

The Nouakchott government has thus opened the way to a lasting reconciliation with the POLISARIO Front. It has also restored a balance in its dealings with Maghrebian countries, reestablishing its diplomatic relations with Algeria, which had been suspended since 1976. But the government still has to rectify the consequences of a war that ravaged its already fragile economy and precipitated social upheaval in the country. In view of Moroccan expansionism, symbolized by annexation of the former Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara--the region of Tiris-el-Gharbia--and Rabat's barely veiled threats,² the Mauritanian Government will still have to devote a good deal of its energy to overcoming the repercussions of the Saharan affair for a long time. In particular, there will continue to be serious problems of military security

¹Concerning Mauritanian policy on the Western Sahara question from 1974 to the July 1978 coup d'etat, see our previous articles in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE of June 1977 and August 1978.

²Morocco claimed sovereignty over Mauritania until 1969 and even today certain political forces consider it to be a part of "Greater Morocco."

in the north because of the presence of Royal Armed Forces along the 1900 border. The risk of pursuit operations in Mauritanian territory cannot be ruled out, since Moroccan troops are now straddling the extremely vulnerable 650-kilometer railroad line by which iron ore from Zouerate is shipped to the port of Nouadhibou. Even while Mauritanian Prime Minister Ould Maïd-lla was in Rabat to discuss the Saharan issue with King Hassan, an exiled former CMSN member in total disrepute, Lt Col Mohamed Ould Abdelkader, was holding a press conference in the Moroccan capital, during which he announced the existence of a movement of "free officers" aimed at overthrowing the government: which would prove that King Hassan still has friends on whom he can rely in the Mauritanian Republic.*

Of all the socioeconomic problems which the CMSN will have to strive to solve, the most pressing is that of reestablishing national unity. Since last year's coup d'etat, racial tension between Moors and black African peoples has been a divisive factor which considerably complicated negotiation of Mauritanian withdrawal from the war. Nor is anything better economically, despite the increase in iron ore exports and the "recovery plan" announced in September. Yet with the appointment of Lt Col Ould Maïdalla as prime minister in June, a new wind has started to stir in the Mauritanian capital: both in theory and in practice, it may be said that austerity is no longer a meaningless slogan. And standards of economic life are beginning to improve, which has been too long overdue.

The coup d'etat which put Col Mustapha Ould Salek in charge of the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMSN) on 10 July 1978 was not only a reactionary move against a senseless war that drained the country's weak human and economic resources. It was also motivated by a sincere desire to put an end to the corruption, poor management and nepotism which characterized the former government. But the stated goal of the Ould Salek government to end the country's commitment to the war without making new enemies quickly ran into a series of obstacles that were difficult to overcome. In the course of months, it became more and more obvious that Rabat's intransigence prevented practically any possibility of negotiating for total peace. Tension between Mauritania and Morocco worsened, to such an extent that former President Ould Salek had to announce in his New Year's message to the nation that "Mauritania will take all necessary measures to withdraw permanently from the war ... if the path leading to an overall agreement remains unfeasible, we are determined to restore peace and harmony and will accept no situation of deliberate obstruction."

The first military committee's lack of determination, combined with its heterogeneous--if not contradictory--composition, gave the forces of destabilization the time and opportunity to deploy the necessary efforts to block the peace process and to undermine the foundations of the CMSN's

*The passports of these individuals, closely linked with the Moroccan lobby, have been confiscated.

leadership. In the months following the coup d'etat, the problem of relations among the various communities comprising the Islamic Republic--Moorish, Wolof, Haalpuleren and Soninke¹--had come to dominate all political life. And this fact was not due to chance, even if it had constantly arisen, sometimes fiercely, since independence. Crystallizing around the issue of language in education,² the problem was exploited by chauvinistic elements of the two communities, thus helping to divert attention from the peace negotiations.

Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, who hardly keeps it a secret that he supports the sharifian cause, aggravated racial tension even more by stating that he could also demand self-determination for the black peoples living on the Mauritanian side of the Senegal River if the Saharan people were granted the same right and by also accusing, without the least bit of evidence, POLISARIO Front forces of executing its black prisoners of war. Finally, the establishment, with the very likely support of the Senegalese, of a Walfougui "Liberation" Front of Mauritania's black African population, totally devoid of representativeness, showed the extent to which certain circles hostile to the government's determination to end the conflict would go. In the beginning of this year, the possibility of a "Chadization" of Mauritania was not purely an academic question ...

Racial Problems and Social Disparities

The black population is definitely struggling for a more equitable distribution of public offices and for better equality of opportunity. But it would be hard to claim that many black Africans want to be united with their Senegalese neighbors. As a racial minority in Mauritania, they have their say concerning the conduct of public affairs and exert influence on government policy. Whereas their "brothers" living on the Senegalese side of the river are largely left out of political life taking place on a distant stage, that of Dakar, and an economy based mainly on peanut growing. As a tribal minority, they have only very limited means of influencing President Senghor's government; and their languages certainly do not have the place that they deserve in a country whose main language is Wolof. Because of a common

¹ Concerning relations between the Moorish and black African communities, see the excellent works of Francis de Chassey: "L'Etrier, la Houe et le Livre" [The Stirrup, the Hoe and the Book] and "Mauritanie, 1960-1975" [Mauritania, 1960-1975], published by Editions Anthropos, Paris.

² In 1966, similar tensions gave rise to violent confrontations between students belonging to the different communities. The unrest occurred at a time of latent crisis when President Duld Daddah and several of his ministers were abroad. Thrown into prison together, the student leaders were put into the position of being able to discuss the situation for the first time and ended by substantially modifying their views on national unity. Today a good number of these former students hold key posts in the government.

history--and a thousand and one other ties--there are more unifying than dividing factors between Mauritania's Moorish and black African communities. And if the national question can finally be posed in clear terms, with the concern of consolidating national unity, the racial tension of recent years should have healthy effects over the long term.

Like the French press, the Senegalese press has certainly helped to aggravate racial problems while obscuring the social reasons for the confrontation between the two communities. Beyond the struggle for influence by the educated elites of the various ethnic groups, little attention has been given to the challenging of the feudal order in rural areas. In the region of Macta-Lajar in August 1978, for example, a series of small dams built at Cheggar-Gadel by a group of harratins (descendants of former black slaves) were destroyed by their Moorish masters with the aid of the regional guard. In many areas, these former slaves represent the main labor force; they sought to emerge from their exploited secular condition by claiming ownership of the land which they cultivated. From another standpoint, the linguistic issue is of secondary importance for the most impoverished Moorish or black peoples who lead a precarious existence in the huge shanty town around Nouakchott.

During the months following the coup d'etat, the CMRN also had to deal with pressures from France. The peace plan submitted to the government of this country, recommending the establishment of a Saharan minination, could not be accepted by Nouakchott and even less by the Polisario Front. A determining factor in the attitude of Paris toward the Ould Salek government was the competition of two Brazilian and French companies at one time to obtain a \$112-million contract for construction of the second section of the trans-Mauritanian highway. When the Mauritanian Government decided to award the contract to the Brazilians, the French Government showed its clear displeasure.

Within the military committee itself, certain members were trying to eliminate progressive members. Thus rumors concerning a coup d'etat by the minister of the interior, Mr Jiddou Ould Salek, were exaggerated by those who wanted to see the president break with the left wing of the CMRN. And when he finally decided to do so, dismissing three of his progressive ministers (and another pro-Moroccan minister at the same time), he cut himself off from part of the forces favorable to a just peace. Moreover, his clumsiness in choosing candidates for the National Advisory Council at the end of March completely alienated him from the black African community. Less than 2 weeks after he had received full powers, a group of pro-Western and pro-Moroccan officers, led by Lt Col Ahmed Ould Bousseif, seized power to stage a palace revolution on 6 April. Alluding to a natural alliance with Morocco, the Ould Bousseif faction tried to destroy the positive results of the Ould Salek government's diplomatic efforts and tried to break up the opposition.

Ould Bousseif's disappearance in the airplane accident in Dakar at the end of May only hastened a new political realignment already forming in the wings of the new Military Committee for National Welfare. In fact, during the short time that he exercised power, Prime Minister Ould Bousseif had been in the minority in the CMRN with regard to domestic issues and foreign policy. His

budget package was even rejected, while several incidents of squandering and diverting government funds were disclosed, in which officers very close to the prime minister (including Lt Col Abdelkader) were implicated.

The appointment of Mr Khouna Ould Haidalla as head of the new government confirmed the power and influence which he acquired in army ranks since the overthrow of the former government. Born in Western Sahara, the new prime minister actually has no social base in the country (which is not an unimportant detail in a country like Mauritania). But he has established himself through his moral influence and strong personality, combining marabout subtlety with military determination. No doubt these qualities largely explain the speed with which the country, under his leadership, has been able to put an end to the situation of "neither war nor peace" which lasted for a year.

From Nomadism to Shanty Town

The Ould Haidalla government is now facing the difficult task of getting the economy back on its feet. The prospects of recovery of iron ore exports--4.5 million tons were exported during the first 6 months of 1979, as opposed to only 6.4 million tons for all of 1978--will not be enough to offset the negative effects of a disjointed economy's serious structural problems. The "recovery plan" made public in September marks a break with the era of prestige projects launched by the Ould Daddah government to the detriment of the rural sector, which was almost totally sacrificed in favor of industrial achievements of doubtful importance to the country, such as the Nouadhibou refinery and the Nouakchott sugar complex. Thus in 1978 the rural sector did not account for more than 20 percent of the gross national product, in comparison to nearly 60 percent in the sixties. Combined with the effects of drought in the Sahel, this negligence of rural productive forces had the effect of totally upsetting the balance of traditional Mauritanian society. The 1977 census showed that within not more than 12 years the numerical ratio between nomads and the settled population was completely reversed: about 65 percent of the population led a nomadic life in 1965, whereas the proportion does not exceed one-third today. Former nomads have found refuge in the shanty towns surrounding the large urban centers, where they lead a miserable existence. It is impossible to predict what will be the long-term effects of this phenomenon in a society formerly based on almost feudal and tribal relationships.

The situation in the countryside was aggravated even more last year by late rains which destroyed part of the crops and fodder intended to feed cattle during the dry season. The consequences of this totally unusual climatic phenomenon could be as serious as those of the worst years of drought in the Sahel. It has been estimated that losses were on the order of 45 percent for herds, reaching as much as 80 percent in areas such as Trarza and Brakna. This means that Mauritania will have to import at least 80,000 tons of grain in 1979. Thus there is an even greater need for the government to translate into action its declared intentions to give priority to the rural sector through measures providing for effective agrarian reform, development of irrigation and modification of traditional production methods.

At the end of 1978, foreign indebtedness had reached \$750 million or a sum equivalent to 143 percent of the gross national product and, before re-scheduling part of the debt, 30 percent of exports. Annual service charges on the debt amounted to about \$60 million, but in negotiating rescheduling of about one-third of the short-term loans, the government is trying to reduce this sum by half, so that it does not absorb more than 15 percent of export revenues.

As part of the liberalization measures taken by the government, access to capital of the government mining company, the National Industrial and Mining Company (SNIM), has been opened to Arab investment.* This enables the company to use its capital share to finance the ambitious project for developing the Guelb iron ore deposit, which should assure replacement of production from the mines of Kedia d'Idjill, which are rapidly being depleted. Plans have also been formulated to borrow \$360 million from a consortium of Arab and Western financiers to cover the first stage of the project. However, the outlook for the European iron and steel industry, far from being bright, and the keen competition of other producing countries, such as Australia and Brazil, require installations in perfect operating condition and security conditions which only the return of peace will guarantee, in order for the Guelb project to succeed.

Without doubt, Mauritania will go through one of the most critical phases in its history in coming months. Despite heavy losses, the Saharan conflict could be the opportunity for a fortunate break with the past if the government is able to mobilize the country's vital forces to consolidate national unity and independence. We may be sure that the forces which contributed to the fall of the CMRN are still at work. But on the other hand, it is just as certain that the new dangers threatening the country will stimulate, among the different communities, the nationalist feeling which enabled Mauritania to survive the beginning of the sixties, when its very new independence had already been seriously put to the test.

*All together, the Arabs purchased SNIM shares for \$120 million, distributed as follows: Kuwait, 40 million; Morocco, 20 million; Arab Mining Company, 28 million; Islamic Bank, 10 million; Iraq, 22 million.

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

BUREAU CHIEF DEPORTED--Paris, Oct 10 (AFP)--The Agence France Presse bureau chief in Nouakchott was ordered deported yesterday by Mauritanian authorities as he left for Dakar, Senegal. AFP Chairman and Managing Director Henri Pigeat today protested to the Mauritanian Government over the expulsion order, which gave Mr Garraud (?24) hours to leave the country. No reason was given for the order, but the Nouakchott government was believed to have objected to a report by Mr Garraud announcing the secret departure for France for medical treatment last week of former President Moktar Ould Daddah. Mr Ould Daddah had been held by military authorities since his overthrow in July 1978. Mr Garraud's predecessor in Nouakchott was expelled last September. [Text] [Paris AFP in English 1832 GMT 10 Oct 79 PA]

CSO: 4420

BRIEFS

FISHING OPERATIONS CLOSURE--Qatar's National Fishing Company has closed because of the depletion of shrimp stocks in the Gulf. Dr Abdul Khalik Imam, head of the Qatari delegation of the Gulf fisheries conference in Doha, last week said QNFC had lost half of its capital of QR 3.5 million (\$900,000) and would cease operations at the end of the month. The liquidation process will start on October 6 and the company's six trawlers will be sold. The shrimp fishing and processing operations in both Qatar and Bahrain are managed by Ross Seafoods, a member of the Ross International Group. In a related development, a committee for the development and management of fisheries in the Indian ocean meeting in Doha last week agreed on the introduction of closed season for shrimp fishing to protect stocks in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The closed season, from March 15 to June 30, will come into effect next year. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 1 Oct 79 p 11]

CSO: 4820

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

FIVE YEAR PLAN PROGRESS--The reports of the control of implementation of second five years plan of the country (1975-80) indicated that the plan will outpass its projected aims with the approval of the end of the fifth and last year of the plan by the middle of next year. The Qatar newsagency correspondent in Riyadh say that economic growth rates of the private Saudi sector indicate that it outpasses the aim of the plan with an annual rate of growth of 18 percent while the planned rate is 13.4 percent per annum; the rate of economic growth in the public sector reached 23 percent while the planned rate was 12.9 percent per annum while that of growth in the oil sector reached a yearly 4 percent. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 15 Sep 79 p 9]

FRENCH DESALINATION ORDER--Saudi Arabia's Saline Water Conversion Corporation has followed major contracts with Japanese and West German companies with an order worth 286 million French francs (\$68 million) to Stein Industrie, a subsidiary of Alsthom Atlantique. According to Alsthom, this is the largest order ever placed with a French firm for large mechanical equipment. Stein will supply six boilers weighing a total of 19,200 tonnes and with a capacity of 780 tonnes per hour each for the desalination project at the Jubail industrial complex. The boilers are due for delivery within 39 months. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORTS & MEMO in English 24 Sep 79 pp 12-13]

CSO: 4820

DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH EXPLORED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 15 Sep 79 pp 1, 5

/Article: "A Grave Report to AL-SAFIR from the Sudan: The South Is Threatening to Revert to the Pre-1972 /Situation/"

/Text/ The southern Sudan region is standing on the threshold of a critical stage which threatens to bring this part of the Sudan back to the situation it was in prior to the March 1972 Addis Ababa agreement ending the civil war which had gone on for 17 years.

Two basic reasons lie behind this:

The obvious difference between the people of the southern Sudan and the regime of President Ja'far Numayri over foreign policy, especially relations with Egypt.

The southerners are in agreement on opposing the current Sudanese-Egyptian rapprochement on the military, political, economic and cultural levels; the agreement for integration between the Sudan and Egypt has been the focus of a violent attack by southern deputies in the People's Assembly, and areas of the southern region have witnessed numerous demonstrations condemning Egyptian interference in the Sudan.

The southerners consider that the rapprochement between Presidents Ja'far Numayri and Anwar al-Sadat is not in the Sudan's interests in any respect and that the southern region, which has been granted autonomy in accordance with the Addis Ababa provisions, considers that this involves a diminution in the Sudan's sovereignty and consequently in the sovereignty of the southern region, that Numayri's policy vis-a-vis al-Sadat has placed the Sudan in a difficult position before the Arab grouping, and that his policy toward such neighboring African countries as Ethiopia has resulted in dangerous repercussions for the country.

In the view of southern intellectuals, the alienation of Numayri's regime from that of al Sadat and the cessation of Egyptian political and military

infiltration into the Sudan are necessary, because the people of the southern Sudan, who constitute one third the population of the Sudan, do not totally accept such a policy--as is the case with the people in the north too.

Deterioration of economic and political conditions in the southern region and the maltreatment of a number of political leaders because of their opposition to Maj Gen Joseph Lago, head of the regional government, about whom news is bruited about that he diverted \$1.5 million in aid from the Arab Gulf to support the region's finances into a personal account in his name in a Nairobi bank.

Reflecting popular grumbling over this event was a group of regional people's assembly members who launched heated verbal discussions during this parliament's meetings which contained clear accusations against the regional government and its head, Maj Gen Lago.

A number of assembly members presented a request from the president of the regional people's assembly, Clement Mboro, whose gist was an invitation to Maj Gen Lago to make a statement to the assembly clarifying the charges directed against him concerning the diversion of Gulf support for his personal benefit. When the assembly chairman accepted the request, enthusiasm swept the council members, who expected the following step; it was agreed that Maj Gen Lago's methods and the failure of his government to solve the region's problems would be exposed.

In response, Maj Gen Lago suddenly went to Khartoum to meet with President Numayri, then returned to Juba. In a few days Numayri went to the southern regional capital and immediately upon his arrival in Juba held a lengthy meeting with the president and members of the regional government then spoke to the regional people's assembly the following day.

Numayri's speech before the assembly came as a surprise and astounded the members, because he totally skirted matters which had been hanging and which the deputies had demanded be solved (along with a clarification of the causes which led to them), concentrating his attack rather on one of the leaders of the region who was a member of the regional government, the minister Samuel Oro, whom President Numayri accused of working against national unity. Numayri showed a letter in Samuel Oro's handwriting to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi describing the deterioration of political and economic conditions in the region of the southern Sudan and requesting that al Mahdi coordinate efforts to restore the parties to their former status. President Numayri characterized the letter as very serious and presented a copy of it to the council so the members could read it as the authorities were arresting minister Samuel Oro on the charge of working against the national unity of the Sudan.

Once again Maj Gen Lago then moved to liquidate his rivals. This time the scapegoat was Clement Mboro, the chairman of the regional people's assembly,

who had accepted the assembly members' request to interrogate Maj Gen Lago. President Numeiri issued a decree dismissing Mboro from his position and also from membership in the Political Bureau. Maj Gen Lago also organized a movement, led by assembly members who supported him, who issued a statement condemning the request that had been made for his interrogation.

Prior to that, President Numeiri had dismissed a number of officials in the regional government, including Dr Wol, minister of commerce, and Joseph Aduhu, member of the Political Bureau.

The situation on the military level was no better than it was on the political level. The changes in political positions were accompanied by similar changes in the army command. In a broad transfer movement among officers and soldiers, a large number of people were shifted from the southern to the northern region and vice versa. Thus the Anya Nya officers who had waged the civil war went to the north and most southern region officers became northern officers.

These changes in military command were aimed, as Maj Gen Lago considers, at guaranteeing his survival as president of the southern region and consequently at his remaining on top in the southern Sudan following the banishment of all elements which did not support him.

The people of the southern Sudan, including military men, look on the matter from a completely different angle, since, in view of the conviction which has arisen among them that it is necessary to remove Maj Gen Lago, they see that the transfer movements in army ranks do not go beyond an attempt to banish southern officers and troops from the region and from the events going on there.

In affirmation of this, pamphlets have been distributed on a broad scale in the town of Juba for the first time since the Addis Ababa agreement condemning the transfers and demanding the return of people who were banished to the north, together with a threat to return to the jungle and launch the war once again.

These pamphlets caused Maj Gen Lago anxiety; he in turn failed to persuade senior southern military men that the objective of the transfer movement was "interaction and merger of Sudanese army elements and the provision of further training for them in the north."

The military command in Khartoum in turn sent a number of senior officers to Juba to learn about the situation and quiet the minds of the southern military men, who, after informing them of their readiness to return to the jungle and reorganize the Anya Nya's ranks unless the military command returned matters to their former state, refused to meet with them.

On top of this is the fact that the southern region is experiencing totally deteriorated economic conditions now that the regional government has failed to pay employees' salaries, even though the money is being sent from Khartoum.

At the same time the areas of the region, including the town of Juba, the region's capital, are experiencing the specter of famine because of a shortage in some commodities and a lack of many commodities, along with an extreme rise in prices, especially prices of bread and corn, which are the inhabitants' main food.

In addition the shortage of petroleum products has been intensified, plunging the town of Juba in darkness for 3 months because the necessary fuel for the power generating plant has been lacking. Transportation inside the town and between the town and other areas has been almost out of the question now that vehicles have stopped functioning--at a time when a cholera epidemic has started to spread into many areas of the region, after spreading within the camps of Uganda refugees.

After all this there comes the hair that broke the camel's back. Maj Gen Lago tried to make up for his lack of popularity by getting close to a number of politicians who had previously lost their positions, foremost among them Hilary Lugali, a former minister who has recently become an assistant to Maj Gen Lago in managing the political affairs of the region. Previously, when he was minister in the regional government, Lugali faced an embarrassing situation when demonstrations erupted in Juba in protest against the agreement between Khartoum and Cairo over the Jonglei project and the arrival of a team of Egyptian engineers at project worksites. The demonstrators burned some property belonging to Hilary Lugali's family that day on the charge by some demonstrators that he had exploited influence and had conducted commercial transactions between the region and east African countries from which he reaped tremendous profits.

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CSO: 4402

POLISARIO SAID TO CONTROL FAR SOUTHEAST OF HASSAN'S KINGDOM

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 18, 19, 20 Sep 79

[Article by Felix Bayon: "With the POLISARIO 620 Kilometers Across the Sahara and Morocco"]

[18 Sep 79, p 9]

[Text] On 24 August 1979 the POLISARIO Front attacked, for the third time in less than 2 months, the town of Lebuiirat, an important military base in southern Morocco. This time the attack was decisive. Morocco's mechanized cavalry lost 10 percent of its potential. Accordingly, the Saharans control the extreme southeastern region of Hassan II's kingdom. At dawn last Sunday, 16 September 1979 a Saharan attack eliminated a convoy which was trying to leave the southern base of Zak, the region's military center. Facing a demoralized army, the POLISARIO Front seems to be gaining ground in the southern region of the enemy's country. Our special correspondent, Felix Bayon, went as far as Lebuiirat, accompanying a patrol of the Saharan army and then continued his trip till he reached a point 30 km from Zak. Beginning today he gives his impressions in various accounts.

On the esplanade of the military detachment of Lebuiirat only the wind was heard whistling among the barbed wire, the tin cans strewn on the rocks, the bumping of the doors opening and closing by themselves, and the sinister hiss of the hinges. It must not be very agreeable to sleep in a place so full of death, but the guerrilla fighters of the POLISARIO Front whom we accompanied had already captured an oasis inside Moroccan territory where they would spend the night. There we found total silence and a sky full of stars. Even the howl of the hyenas at daybreak seemed as bucolic and inoffensive as the awakening of a chicken coop.

We made the rounds of the 36 outposts that protected the Moroccan base of Lebairat located among the hills surrounding the basin where the fortress is located. With our Land Rover (which until a short while earlier used to belong to the Moroccan army) we came to within some 30 km of Zak, the most important military base in southern Morocco. That is where the remaining earmarks of the battle of Lebairat could be found. One could still see on the sand the debris of the meshed tank tracks forming network covering the entire area. The Saharans got as far as that point in pursuit of their enemies. There were several gutted tanks and an ammunition transport truck which had exploded into a thousand fragments after being hit by the POLISARIO's fire. The burned corpses of its three occupants were lying at the side of the vehicle. One of them had his bowels exposed, the hyenas having already begun to operate.

Not far from there, at the foot of a hill, hidden among the underbrush, was the corpse of a wounded soldier who had tried to flee on his own. Thirty kilometers northeast of Lebairat we continued to find bodies, some of them having been disinterred by the latest rains. They were the remains of 615 Moroccan troops killed on 24 August 1979 in the battle of Lebairat.

We counted 51 destroyed vehicles: 26 T-54 tanks, 13 armored troop transport vehicles, and 12 armored cars. The total is estimated to represent 10 percent of the Moroccan mechanized cavalry. Nearly all the equipment was of Soviet make. Only the guns mounted on some of the armored cars were of French origin. Everything seems to indicate that this equipment had been shipped from Egypt. The age of some of the armored cars suggested that they had been used in the Sinai war before coming to perish in this desert.

Tea, Asphalt, Cologne Water, and Records

At the side of the burned-out vehicles the strangest objects were in evidence: They ranged from packets of tea, cans of asphalt, and bottles of Cologne water all the way to old Spanish-made records, one of pasodobles and the other of Frank Sinatra.

"This is already more than a war of guerrillas; it is a war of positions," one of the POLISARIO men said proudly.

Nearly all the tanks that we saw had been abandoned and destroyed by flames rather than by artillery. The Saharan soldiers had set them on fire to avoid having the Moroccans retrieve them. Why did the Saharans not take them away? "Tanks are not appropriate for desert warfare. We prefer Land Rovers," said Ahmed Salama, a POLISARIO soldier who used to work at the telephone exchange of Aaiun up to the day when Spain decided to relinquish its former colony.

The positions surrounding the fortress of Lebairat had all the earmarks of having been abandoned in haste. The soil was strewn with steel helmets and belts. The attack had surprised the Moroccan troops when they were sound asleep. It was 0500 hours in the morning of 24 August 1979 when the first shots were fired. Earlier (on 6 July and 10 August), the POLISARIO Front had attacked the base causing widespread damage and destroying part of the Moroccan arsenal.

The detachments which occupied these defensive positions used to be rotated every 6 months. All that time they would remain there without being able to go down the hill. Each of the positions had a tank and an armored troop transport vehicle as well as a series of primitive stone constructions within whose confines all the soldiers' activities would take place for half a year. Living conditions did not help, to be sure, to lift the morale of the forces. Immobilized on the top of the hills, the Moroccans waited by night and by day for the arrival of their enemies. The insecurity of the region prevented them from moving outside the fortress when they were off-duty. The sentinels could not leave their posts on nights of tense expectation. They were even obliged to move their bowls within the defense structures themselves.

No One Knows How Many They Were

How many men used to defend Lebairat? That is difficult to determine. At the start those charged with defending the base number 1,200. But according to what Moroccan officers who are now prisoners of the POLISARIO told us, on 24 August there were only about 500 men who could be used for combat duties.

It is as difficult to find out the number of the defenders as it is of the attackers. According to the POLISARIO soldiers, the guerrilla column which took Lebairat consisted only of 150 men. "Even though it seems untrue, that is a definite fact," one of them asserted. The Moroccan officers who are now prisoners and whom we had a chance to interview felt unable to give us a concrete figure. It seemed very difficult for them to come up with details. The defense of Lebairat must have been quite chaotic. "There were many attackers and they all launched the assault simultaneously," one of them told us. "[In order to accomplish what they did they must have had at least 500 Land Rovers (about 3,500 men)," a Moroccan noncommissioned officer suggested.

The Moroccans must have panicked. Only in this way can we explain their conflicting versions and the condition in which we found the battleground. The reinforcements sent from the Zak base (the region's military center located about 70 km from Lebairat) did not arrive in time. The first relief column practically set its fleeing buddies head on. Even 30 km from Zak the POLISARIO had the opportunity of setting up an ambush. Only the second Moroccan relief column achieved part of its mission: To recover the bodies.

The Moroccan air force could do nothing. Four F-5 fighter-bombers and three helicopters appeared in the sky early in the morning. They were unable to act. The confusion was total and they could not distinguish their own forces from those of the Saharans while the smoke from the burning vehicles prevented them from seeing things clearly.

[19 Sep 79, p 7]

[Text] A strange land with the soldiers' pay reaching them in dropper-like amounts, their families far, a close and mysterious enemy (many were told that Cubans and Vietnamese were involved), with no more than 15 days' leave a year, and unable to move away from the base for fear of guerrilla attacks. It is understandable that Morocco should have lost the battle of Lebuiat and that soldier Ahmed Kasri should have admitted in a letter to his mother: "I am losing my mind and I believe that they will lock me up in an insane asylum." Our special correspondent Felix Bayon, who arrived in Lebuiat with the guerrilla fighters of the POLISARIO Front, today describes the living conditions in that Moroccan town, now occupied by the Saharans.

Lebuiat's only luxury continued to be half alive: A small orchard in the middle of the desert in which some maize, castor-oil plants, tomatoes, soybeans, and a single sunflower, today the only flower in Lebuiat, grow thanks to water stored in a well.

The houses of Lebuiat evidenced practically no sign of the battle whatever. The few stores there were burned out and a wall bore traces of a burst of submachine gun fire. In the town located only a few meters from the base lived 166 Saharans and the Moroccan officers.

The 166 Saharans had reached the town of Lebuiat after a long trek across the desert. Until then they had been nomads. The Moroccan army brought their camels and obliged them to live in Lebuiat. According to the POLISARIO Front the Moroccans tried thereby to avoid attacks by the Saharan army which, in principle, would be afraid to kill its own fellow-citizens.

The Saharans of Lebuiat lived from small trade. In order to subsist some of them used to travel to Tantan to buy tobacco and perfume items which it was difficult to find at the base and which they would subsequently sell to the Moroccan troops. With the money they obtained from this traffic they would buy food from the Moroccans.

Months before the battle 16 Saharan youths living in Lebuiat had escaped in order to join the POLISARIO Front. They were captured by the Moroccan army and today they are in jail.

Life for the civilians in Lebuirat had been very difficult. It was forbidden for them to light candles (to avoid that somebody should send signals to the guerrillas). It was also prohibited for the residents to meet to pray together (for fear of possible political talk), for the women to invite each to drink tea in their homes (for similar reasons), and for the children to romp outside of the town limits (so that they might not carry any messages to the POLISARIO fighters). From 1800 hours in the afternoon to 0600 hours in the morning, the small town lived under a rigid curfew.

A Donkey and a Dog, the Only Residents

The small single-floor adobes were now deserted. Inside one of them was the only resident: A solitary donkey, hungry, thirsty, and frightened. One kilometer to the south we found another animal: A dog which was sniffing about a destroyed tank in search of food. The 166 inhabitants of Lebuirat are now living in refugee camps located in southern Algeria.

On a nearby hill, inside one of the casemates of one of the 36 outposts which used to protect the base of Lebuirat, we found a school notebook held down under two cakes of washing soap. It was the notebook used by a Moroccan soldier, Ahmed Kasri, to take notes in his classes of military theory.

Among many diagrams there were a few lines of poetry in French, proper to a man who was lonely and sensitive: "I like paradise, but why don't I like to pray?" "My love who has lost her mind...." "I like wax tapers so that I may later blow them out."

In his notebook Kasri had jotted down in Arabic the draft of a letter to his mother. The ink of his ball point pen was green, a color of special significance for Muslims. The date was 16 November 1978, some 10 months before the battle of Lebuirat.

"Dearly beloved mother, I greet you from the bottom of my heart," Kasri had started to write. "My mother and companion, what an honor it is to take my pen in my hand to write you these lines in green, dictated by a heart which loves you a lot and which is full of sadness when it thinks of you. I think of you fondly as well as of the young ones who live at home. I see poverty, the sorry situation, and the tortures in whose midst I have been living for the past few years. Now we are here and fate has obliged us to experience all these difficulties. Mother, you stand in front of my eyes when I review the recent past and see it so gloomy. At times I look at the present and find it to be worse than the past, more depressing than it. If I wanted to write everything that I have in my heart I would need millions and millions of sheets. I am now writing my letter and my tears are falling and falling, as if the River Nile were overflowing. My heart is boiling like a tea kettle over a hot fire. I am losing my mind and I believe that they will lock my up in an insane asylum because I now know what has been happening to you people and especially what is happening to my younger siblings when

they get home and find no bread. What will they do? I know that I cannot prevent my brothers from going hungry. But what can I do? I have not been paid these past few months and my heart, my life, and I are all scalded. I cannot do anything but resist."

They Could Only Wait

"The only solution," Ahmed Kasri continued, "is to wait. And all of this, dear mother, I experience night and day, morning and evening, and at each moment. I beg that you resist and wait just as I resist and wait until they decide to pay me in the next few months. I shall then send you 300 [Moroccan] dirhams (equivalent to some 4,500 [Spanish] pesetas).

"Give my regards to all. To you I send warmer love than to anyone else. Also, give my affection to my sister and her husband, to Fatima, Suad, Aisha, Idrisi, and Nadia, and to all those who ask after me. Also convey my regards to my uncle and aunt and to all their children and the husbands of their daughters. Also, to my cousin Safir and all her sons, and both to my grandmothers. And I ask you, dear mother, that you let me know about the problem which my father had with the government and what happened. Give me the address of his lawyer. I now bid you all farewell with my pen but not with my heart. Write soon. I note that I am not receiving your letters. Ahmed Kasri."

At the margin of the draft there were a few lines in French: "All of this passes, but you, dear mother, remain constant and will always be in my heart."

Together with the school notebook of Ahmed Kasri, under the two cakes of washing soap, there was a letter addressed to another soldier of Lebuirat by a Moroccan trooper assigned to another fortified place. At the top of the letter, drawn in childish hand, was a large peace dove.

Kasri was right in being concerned about not receiving letters from his family. According to what a Moroccan noncommissioned officer, held prisoner by the POLISARIO Front, told us, in a number of cases mail censors used to destroy letters written by the relatives of soldiers to avoid that the latter know of their daily problems. In this way the soldiers would not demand the pay owed to them and on which their families subsistence depended in large measure.

The soldiers of Lebuirat earned—including bonuses—the equivalent of some 14,000 pesetas a month. Some of them were married, had children, and were the only source of income for the family. The soldiers received only 15 days' leave a year.

Confined to a detachment in a region whose climate and geography were very different from those in their villages, waiting for the arrival of a mysterious enemy who, according to Moroccan propaganda, was made up of Cubans and Vietnamese troops, it was not rare for the morale of the Moroccans to plummet when they found out the facts of this harsh war and some, like Ahmed Kasri, thought that they were losing their minds.

[20 Sep 79, p 6]

[Text] Lebuiat was attacked on three consecutive occasions by the POLISARIO Front: On 6 July and on 10 and 24 August 1979. This last instance proved to be final. For more than a month the Moroccan officers had been sending messages to the Moroccan high command, notifying it of the sorry condition of their weapons and troops. Even though the officers of Lebuiat saw their defeat to be very close at hand, their superiors did not make a big thing out of it. Because of his communiques, Captain Azelmat was called to testify in Tantan and was shot a little more than a week ago. Our special correspondent, Felix Bayon, has had access to the Moroccan documents captured by the POLISARIO Front and has spoken with the officers held as prisoners. This part today concludes Bayon's series about the battle of Lebuiat.

"We suspect the presence of rebels in the vicinity. Stop. Attack imminent. Stop. Send reinforcements." This telegram, dated 23 August 1979, one day before the battle, was the final message sent by the Moroccan command of Lebuiat of which there is documentary evidence.

After traveling for 3 days across liberated territories and southern Morocco, we reached the refugee camps in southern Algeria. The return trip was as peaceful as the outward journey. There was again time to stop and drink tea in the scanty shade of the "tahls" (thorny trees) which now, because of the latest rainfall, was slightly more sprightly and leafy than usual.

And in Algerian territory members of the POLISARIO Front showed us the prisoners and equipment captured in the battle of Lebuiat. On one side, seated on the ground, were two groups of prisoners. The smaller group consisted of Moroccan officers and noncommissioned officers. The other group, the troops, sat facing the captured materiel: One tank, three cannons, 21 armed Land Rovers, four trucks, several hundred automatic rifles, four Spanish mortars manufactured in 1977 by Esperanza and Company, hundreds of identification booklets of the Moroccan army, decorations, stripes, stars, and several ammunition crates filled with documents found in Lebuiat.

Among the papers was the passport of Capt Mohamed Azelmat, in charge of the Lebuiirat base, summoned before 24 August by his superiors and recently shot by the Moroccans following their rout.

The passport was old and it indicated that Captain Azelmat was a man who traveled little. He used it only once, from 3 to 15 May 1971, when he visited Britain.

We cannot say whether Azelmat's fate is customary among Moroccan officers assigned to the Sahara and southern Morocco but, in any case, it is significant.

Among the documents that we had the opportunity to review there were many communications from Azelmat in two of which he desperately reported the difficulties in which he found himself. According to his accounts, the war materiel was in bad shape, he was short of ammunition, and his troops were showing clear symptoms of demoralization.

After the second and penultimate POLISARIO attack of 10 August 1979, Captain Azelmat made an apocalyptic report of the battle and concluded: "After the slaughter and owing especially to the shortage of weapons and the immobilization of the last remaining vehicles, I have to report that the personnel of the third tank group (Lebuiirat) are not operational, that they are traumatized and demoralized, and that a major catastrophe in the next attack can be foreseen."

On 3 August 1979 Captain Azelmat had described the frame of mind of the troops and asked for his men to be relieved. "The men are tired after serving here for 4 years," "the soldiers have to stay awake all night," and so on.

The correspondence of Captain Azelmat was also full of criticism of the command and of requests for reinforcements. On 16 August 1979 he sent the following message: "Considering the means used by the enemy in his attacks, the locality of Lebuiirat can no longer be held. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and troops are traumatized, demoralized, evidence ill-humor, and refuse to return to their initial positions. Some civilians are threatening to leave town. A third enemy attack would result in their taking the place."

On 20 August 1979, 4 days before the POLISARIO Front finally seized Lebuiirat and a few hours before Captain Azelmat went to Tantan, summoned by the military authorities which, a few weeks later, had him shot, Lebuiirat's commander drafted one of his final communiques. His tone was by now more dramatic than ever. He reported: "There are 1,500 souls and thousands of widows and orphans who will haunt the conscience of the command. The unit's commander (Captain Azelmat was referring to himself) completely declines to accept any responsibility. He has made promises and lied a lot to his men and none of his promises have been fulfilled. The innumerable sacrifices made have not been followed by any tangible result."

The Prisoner Officers Speak

Today Captain Azelmat is already dead, but 40 km south of Tindouf, Algeria, on the sands of the desert, Moroccan officers, now survivors and prisoners, told us, still with surprised gestures, why the Moroccan detachment of Lebuirat was unforgivably defeated. Even though 3 weeks had elapsed since the event the prisoners still appeared confused. There were many picturesque turns of phrase in their reports. "They, the Moroccans...", they reiterated several times before a Moroccan officer and noncommissioned officer corrected them.

Lt Hassan Amrani, 25 years of age, a recent graduate of the military academy, was the most senior officer in Lebuirat on the day of the final battle. He is now a prisoner. Is it certain that the POLISARIO guerrillas killed 615 Moroccan troops? we asked him. "I don't know, I don't know how many they were," he replied, "but in any case there were many killed. How is it possible to avoid having so many casualties when we were left with no equipment and the troops were demoralized on account of the shortage of supplies and the unlawful nature of the war?"

Standing with Lieutenant Amrani was Capt Mohamed Ait Cherif, 53 years old, captured at the battle of Bir Anzaram on 11 August 1979. Ait Cherif is an old military hand who served in the French army before Morocco's independence. He had fought in the liberation of Europe during World War II, was at the front in France and at Cassino (Italy), and volunteered for service against the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. He holds three decorations: The French Military Medal, the Legion of Honor, and the War Cross.

"Can I talk to you in your capacity as a former officer in the French army?" the veteran newsman Rene Mauries of LA DEPECHE of Toulouse [France] asked him. "Yes," the captain answered with pride, "but please know that you have to begin recognizing that I hold the French Military Medal.

"What you people have told me is terrible. Fifty-one armored vehicles destroyed in Lebuirat! And you yourself have seen this? I have never seen anything like it. Lebuirat will make it possible to know the truth about this war," the captain said.

"And what if the POLISARIO Front continues its attacks and manages to capture Zak?" we asked Lieutenant Amrani. "Well then," he answered right away, "that will be the end of Morocco's presence in the area."

Among the group of officers we found two Moroccan staff sergeants from Nador (a city located in northern Morocco, about 12 km from Melilla). One of them, Mohamed Zariouhi, 43 years of age, married with seven children, had served in the Spanish army from 1951 until Morocco's independence.

"No, the members of the POLISARIO Front have not mistreated us, it is true. The bad thing is that we are very bored but they take good care of us. We eat the same things as they. Their interrogations are brief. 'Do you have anything to say?' they asked us. And if we had nothing to tell them they left us in peace. They have no problems but rather possess abundant information about how our army operates."

The sun was at its peak and it was hot. We lit some cigarettes originating from the Canary Islands of a brand familiar to them. "How good it would be to be seated at the Metropol coffee house in Melilla," Zariouhi concluded.

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POLISARIO LEADER DEFINES GOALS, METHODS

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 12 Sep 79 pp 1, 7

/Article: "Ma El-Ainaine Ould Es-Seddik in a Conversation with AL-SHA'B: Two Thirds of the World's Nations Have Recognized the Saharan People's Right To Determine Their Destiny and Gain Independence"/

/Text/ Mr Ma El-Ainaine Ould Es-Seddik, member of the Political Bureau and assistant director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamra and Rio de Oro /POLISARIO/ made a special statement to AL SHA'B in which he evaluated the results of the sixth summit conference of the nonaligned nations in general and the victories the struggle of the people of the Sahara gained at this important international tribunal, which represents two thirds of the world, confirmed the right of the people of the Sahara to determine their destiny and gain independence, and unreservedly condemned the Moroccan occupation.

Mr Ma El-Ainaine began his talk by saying "The convening of the sixth non-aligned nations' summit conference in the capital of the island of liberty, Havana, from 3 to 7 September, was an occasion for the international community's renewed confirmation of the firm legitimate rights of the people of the Sahara to independence and sovereignty over all their national soil in the framework of their country's internationally recognized boundaries, as a consequence of the great attention our people's just cause, in its capacity as a cause for the liquidation of imperialism, enjoyed during the conference, as it is one of the important causes which constitutes the focus of two thirds of the entire world's concerns.

Satisfaction with the Results

He then described the satisfaction greeting the conclusions the nonaligned conference produced--especially as far as the conference's recommendation concerning the Sahara issue went--among the people of the Sahara and their vanguard the POLISARIO front, stating "We in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamra and Rio de Oro are very content with the positive conclusions which the Havana meeting produced. These results

were the fruit of the efforts of the heads of the nonaligned governments and countries and are tantamount to the aspirations of the peoples of the third world who yearn for progress, peace and stability in Africa, Asia or Latin America."

Concerning the new diplomatic victory of the people of the Sahara and their just cause, Mr Ma El-Ainaine said, "Two thirds of the countries of the world most explicitly recognize the rights of the Saharan people to determine their destiny and obtain independence, without reservation condemn the royal Moroccan occupation of the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara and without ambiguity condemn the policy of expansion which the royal regime is carrying out against the people of the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara and the people of the region in general."

A Military and Political Fact

Mr Ma El-Ainaine then talked about the peace agreement concluded between the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the reverberation which greeted the nonaligned conference in Havana, saying "The Algiers agreement is to be considered the consecration of recognition of the fact that the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara exists as a political and military reality and an independent sovereign nation exposed to foreign military aggression launched by one of the member countries of the nonaligned movement, an aggression which the international community has again bluntly condemned through the medium of the sixth conference of nonaligned nations."

A New Victory

He then went on to say, "The repeated recognition of the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara which occurred on the conference podium, especially by the countries of Latin America, were only one further success for the people of the Sahara and an extension of their just cause to Latin America. (Eight more countries, seven of them from Latin America, recognized the Republic of the Sahara at this conference.) Therefore one can state"-- as Mr Ma El-Ainaine continued--"that the results of the conference in the just, legitimate struggle by the people of the Sahara to regain their sovereignty over their territory and protect their national independence were great, and the conference was a victory for the nonaligned movement's principles, goals and high example."

He then went on to say "This is to be considered one of the greatest victories on the political and diplomatic level, not only because it was won in a movement comprising the majority of the countries of the third world and the majority of the countries of the world, but also because this movement, through its position, declared that it stands alongside the Saharan people's struggle for the total liberation of their nation. This is the first time the movement has recognized the Saharan people's rights to total independence, and it consider at the same time that the Sahara issue is one of the liquidation imperialism."

"It is also the first time in which a recommendation is being issued by the movement mentioning the Popular Front not as a party to the Western Sahara issue but in the context of the peace agreement, which the conference saluted. As far as the countries of the movement are concerned, this must be considered an embodiment and consecration of the consideration of the front as the legitimate representative of the people of the Sahara, as was stated in the Algiers agreement."

He then said, "Morocco, for the first time in the context of international organizations, has been condemned as an expansionist occupier state, and this is a new victory to be added to the daily ones which our people are winning on the military, political and diplomatic levels. The isolation which Morocco is experiencing on the international plane, especially at conferences like the nonaligned conference, which adopts all resolutions and recommendations unanimously not by vote, has become apparent."

Determined To Continue the Struggle

He went on to say "The people of the Sahara, while expressing satisfaction with this victory, stressed their determination to continue their struggle for liberation in order to implant respect for their legitimate rights to independence and national sovereignty and respect for their defense of the resolutions and documents of these international organizations which acknowledge that they possess these lawful rights."

We Thank Revolutionary Cuba

Mr Ma El-Ainaine concluded his statement by saying, "On this occasion, the people of the Sahara want to offer their thanks to revolutionary Cuba, its righteous leaders, and the progressive countries in Africa, the Arab world, and all countries which have unreservedly expressed their support for our people's rights during this conference. We hope that the Organization of African Unity resolutions expressing Africa's clear position, and the Havana resolution, will once again enjoy the support and defense of the countries in these two organizations and other member countries of the United Nations General Assembly which has a basic and principal role in eliminating imperialism in the Western Desert. We are convinced that the Rabat regime will also confront the same determination and support in the United Nations which the majority of the world's countries expressed in defense of our people's rights."

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